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Abstract 20 
Psychologists are beginning to uncover the rational basis for many of the biases revealed over 21 
the last 50 years in deductive and causal reasoning, judgement and decision-making. In this 22 
paper, it is argued that a manipulation, experiential learning, shown to be effective in judgement 23 
and decision-making may elucidate the rational underpinning of the implicit negation effect in 24 
conditional inference. In three experiments, this effect was created and removed by using 25 
probabilistically structured contrast sets acquired during a brief learning phase. No other theory 26 
of the implicit negations effect predicts these results, which can be modelled using Bayes nets as 27 
in causal approaches to category structure. It is also shown how these results relate to a recent 28 
development in the psychology of reasoning called “inferentialism.” It is concluded that many of 29 
the same cognitive mechanisms that underpin causal reasoning, judgement and decision-making 30 
may be common to logical reasoning, which may require no special purpose machinery or 31 
module.  32 
Keywords:  Polarity biases, negations, experiential learning, reasoning biases, new 33 
paradigm, causal Bayes nets, inferentialism. 34 
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“All human systems of communication contain a representation of negation. No animal 43 
communication system includes negative utterances, and consequently none possesses a 44 
means for assigning truth value, for lying, for irony, or for coping with false or 45 
contradictory statements.” (Horn, 1989, p. xiii) 46 
 47 
The psychology of judgement, decision making, causal, and deductive reasoning reveals many 48 
apparent biases. Biases are systematic deviations from the predictions of a normative theory of 49 
how people should respond on a task. Explaining these biases is a major industry in cognitive 50 
psychology/science that has driven many important theoretical developments. Common patterns 51 
of explanation are that the wrong normative theory has been applied to a task (Oaksford & 52 
Chater, 1994, 2007; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & Yearsley, 2017); 53 
that people are responding to a different question that has an equally normative answer (Griffths, 54 
& Tenenbaum, 2005; Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013); the information was not presented in an 55 
understandable format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hogarth, & Soyer, 2011; Jarvstad, Hahn, 56 
Rushton, & Warren, 2013; Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, & Hertwig, 2018); we need to take 57 
account of noise (Costello & Watts, 2014; Costello, Watts, & Fisher, 2018); or that the 58 
mind/brain approximates probabilities by sampling (Dasgupta, Schulz, & Gershman, 2017; 59 
Hattori, 2016; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006), an approach aligned 60 
with the classical strategy in the psychology of deductive reasoning of explaining biases at the 61 
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algorithmic not computational level (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rips, 1994). Most of these 62 
explanations explain away biases while retaining the normative standard of rationality given by 63 
classical binary logic (mental logic/mental models) or Bayesian probability theory.1 That we are 64 
beginning to understand the sources of bias in judgement and decision making also resolves a 65 
paradox. Explaining biases in the psychology of deductive reasoning, like confirmation bias, has 66 
invoked Bayesian probability theory as a normative standard (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2007, 67 
2020a). Yet, paradoxically, Bayesian reasoning in judgement and decision-making had seemed 68 
equally biased. It also opens up the possibility that the way that biases have been explained away 69 
in judgement and decision-making may also apply to the psychology of deductive reasoning. 70 
In this paper, we investigate a key outstanding problem in the psychology of conditional 71 
inference, that is, reasoning with if p then q in English, where p is the antecedent and q the 72 
consequent. Polarity biases occur when negations (“not”) are varied in conditionals (Evans, 73 
1972, 1998; Evans & Lynch, 1973; Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford & 74 
Stenning, 1992; Oaksford & Mousakowski, 2004; Schroyens, Schaeken, Fias, & d’Ydewalle, 75 
2000; Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2001; Schroyens, Schaeken, Verschueren, & 76 
d’Ydewalle, 2000; Yama, 2001). As our opening quotation from Horn (1989) indicates, 77 
negations are a defining feature of human linguistic communication. The Aristotelean foundation 78 
of logic, the principle of non-contradiction, cannot be formulated without negations (a 79 
                                                 
 
1 An exception is quantum probability (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013), which represents a different theory 
based on quantum logic. It can only be viewed as normative for human reasoning if following its dictates is rational. 
As for classical probability theory, this question depends on showing that not following its prescriptions leads one to 
accept bets one is bound to lose, the so-called Dutch book (Vineberg, 2011). Demonstrating this seems to rely on 
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proposition p cannot be both true and false, i.e., not (p and not p)). Negations allow us to deny 80 
the claims made by others, setting up contradictions that must be resolved by argumentation 81 
(Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2020a). Horn (1989, p. xiii) argued that, “…the 82 
absolute symmetry definable between affirmative and negative propositions in logic is not 83 
reflected by a comparable symmetry in language structure and language use.” It may not be 84 
surprising therefore, that, when compared to the standard of formal logic, people’s reasoning 85 
with negations appears biased. 86 
In the conditional inference paradigm, people may be asked whether they endorse 87 
inferences like, if Johnny does not travel to Manchester (not p) then he takes the train (q), He did 88 
not take the train (not q), therefore he travelled to Manchester (p). This inference has the form of 89 
a logically valid modus tollens (MT) argument (formally, if p then q, ¬q, therefore, ¬p, where 90 
“¬” = not). Illogically, people endorse MT more when it has a negated conclusion (for an if p 91 
then q conditional) than when it has an affirmative conclusion (for an if ¬p then q conditional), 92 
as in our example (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1996; Evans & Handley, 1999). This phenomenon 93 
occurs for all four conditionals in the negations paradigm, when negations are systematically 94 
varied between the antecedent and consequent (if p then q, if p then ¬q, if ¬p then q, and if ¬p 95 
then ¬q). However, this negative conclusion bias is subject to a dramatic effect: it disappears by 96 
the simple manipulation of using implicit negations in the categorical premise. For example, 97 
denying the consequent of our MT inference by asserting He travelled by car, rather than He did 98 
not take the train.  99 
The implicit negation effect occurs not only for MT but also for the logical fallacies of 100 
denying the antecedent (DA: if p, then q, ¬p, therefore ¬q) and affirming the consequent (AC: if 101 
p, then q, q, therefore p), and for the other logically valid inference rule of modus ponens (MP: if 102 
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p, then q, p, therefore q). For example, the AC inference on if not A, then not 2 using an explicit 103 
negation, not 2, produces 61% endorsements of the conclusion, not A. In contrast, using an 104 
implicit negation, 7, causes this to fall to 11% (Evans & Handley, 1999, Expt. 3). Although 105 
implicit negations remove negative conclusion bias, they do not lead to logical performance. 106 
They reduce conclusion endorsements as much for logically valid inferences (MP, MT) as for 107 
logical fallacies (DA, AC).  108 
Explanations of this effect may discriminate between the Bayesian new paradigm 109 
approach (Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000; Oaksford & Chater, 2003, 2007, 110 
2020a), heuristic approaches (Evans, 1998; Evans et al., 1996; Evans & Handley, 1999), and 111 
mental models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 112 
2012), but the critical tests have never been conducted.2 Our experiments attempt to provide 113 
these tests. They used probability manipulations shown in decision making to improve 114 
participants’ understanding of a task and to lead to better fits to the data (Jarvstad et al., 2013; 115 
Wulf, et al., 2018). We used short experiential learning phases and asked participants for their 116 
subjective estimates of the learned probabilities that we used to predict the results on the 117 
inference task. This is the first time that discrete experiential learning has been used to 118 
manipulate probabilities in deductive reasoning tasks. We predicted that different acquired 119 
                                                 
 
2 One reason why the critical tests were not conducted may be because the effects were mainly observed 
for abstract materials, not real world thematic materials (Evans, 1998, 2002). Consequently, it seemed that these 
biases, although present in the lab, may not generalize to raise concerns about any real world behavior. However, the 
motivations for both main theories, the matching heuristic (Evans, 1998, 2002) and the contrast set account 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Oaksford, et al., 2000; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992), came from the pragmatics of 
negation in natural discourse. Like other illusions created in the lab, perceptual (e.g., the Muller-Lyer illusion) or 
cognitive, they may still be highly instructive about the normal function of the cognitive system (e.g., the importance 
of prior experience of a carpentered world).  
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distributions should be able to create or remove the implicit negation effect in conditional 120 
inference. No other theory predicts these effects. 121 
We first briefly introduce the probabilistic Bayesian new paradigm approach to 122 
conditional reasoning (for a recent review see, Oaksford & Chater, 2020a). We show how the 123 
concept of a contrast set (Oaksford 2002; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992) can explain the implicit 124 
negations effect, and how it can be created and removed by simple probabilistic manipulations. 125 
Testing these predictions requires an effective way of manipulating probabilities. Therefore, we 126 
then discuss why using experiential learning may prove a useful method, as in judgement and 127 
decision-making (Wulf, et al., 2018). We then introduce our first experiment and derive the 128 
specific predictions that we tested. 129 
 130 
Probabilities and Contrast Sets 131 
The new Bayesian paradigm in human reasoning is a broad church (Oaksford & Chater, 2020a). 132 
However, there are several assumptions common to these approaches. First, the conditional is not 133 
a binary truth functional operator, as in the standard logic, that licenses the validity of MP and 134 
MT and not of AC and DA. Second, the probability of a conditional is the conditional 135 
probability, Pr(if p then q) = Pr(q|p).3 This assumption is called “the Equation” (Edgington, 136 
1995). Third, probabilities are subjective and relate to individuals’ degrees of belief. Finally, 137 
conditional probabilities are suppositional and determined by the Ramsey test: suppose p is true, 138 
add it to your stock of beliefs and read off your degree of belief in q.  139 
                                                 
 
3 In standard logic, which assumes that propositions are true or false, if p then q is false is p is true 
and q is false, and true otherwise. Consequently, Pr(if p then q) = Pr(p, q) + Pr(¬p, q) + Pr(¬p, ¬q), an 
assignment that is very rarely observed empirically. 
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There are a variety of sophisticated probabilistic approaches to conditional inference, for 140 
example, probability logic (Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & Over, 2015; Evans, Thompson, & Over, 141 
2015; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014), 142 
belief revision (Eva & Hartmann, 2018; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2010b, 2013), and Bayes nets 143 
(Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011; Chater & Oaksford, 2006; Fernbach & Erb, 2013; Oaksford & 144 
Chater, 2010b, 2013, 2017). We will discuss these in the sequel. For now, as a first 145 
approximation, we assume that the probability of a conclusion of an inference is its conditional 146 
probability given the categorical premise calculated over a joint probability distribution (JPD) 147 
(Anderson, 1995; Oaksford et al., 2000).4 We can then derive our predictions by considering two 148 
JPDs one without (Table 1) and one with contrast sets (Table 2).  149 
 150 
Table 1 151 




Contradictory Negation 156 
Suppose your initial beliefs about Johnny’s travelling habits are captured by the JPD Pr0 in Table 157 
1. In this table, p and ¬p are contradictories, and are treated with “absolute symmetry” (Horn, 158 
1989, p. xiii). If one of these propositions is true the other is false, but finding out that Johnny 159 
did not travel to Manchester conveys nothing about where he may have travelled.  160 
                                                 
 
4 In the General Discussion, we show that both the belief revision and Bayes nets accounts make 
exactly the same prediction as we derive here. We also identify a problem for the belief revision account 
that is resolved by treating inference as belief update in Bayes nets. 
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In Pr0, you are reasonably confident that if he travels to Manchester (p), he takes the train 161 
(q). Your degree of belief in the conditional is the relevant conditional probability computed over 162 
this JPD, Pr0(q|p) = .75. However, you are maximally uncertain about whether he takes the train 163 
or not when he does not travel to Manchester (Pr0(q|¬p) = Pr0(¬q|¬p) = .5). You also know that 164 
just less than half of his journeys are to Manchester (Pr0(p) = .4). Now suppose either that you 165 
learn (1) from experience or a reasonably reliable informant. 166 
(1) If Johnny does not travel to Manchester, he does not take the train.  167 
We assume that the result of learning or hearing (1) from a reliable source, leads you to revise 168 
your beliefs about Johnny’s travelling habits to the JPD Pr1 in Table 1, in which Pr1(¬q|¬p) = 169 
Pr1(¬p, ¬q)/Pr1(¬p) = .5/.6 = .833.
5 In our experiments, we provide people with relevant 170 
experience to revise their beliefs from Pr0 to Pr1, where Pr1 implements manipulations designed 171 
to test our account of the implicit negations effect. In the sequel, we fit the model to previous 172 
data to estimate people’s default prior beliefs, Pr0. 173 
Suppose you then learn that, on a particular journey, Johnny did not take the train. With 174 
what probability should you now believe that he did not go to Manchester? We treat this query as 175 
the probabilistic equivalent of an AC inference having learned (1), and with Johnny did not take 176 
the train as the categorical premise. As we have said, for now, we treat he probability of the 177 
conclusion of an inference as the conditional probability of the conclusion given the categorical 178 
premise calculated over the JPD Pr1 in Table 1 (Anderson, 1995; Oaksford et al., 2000). So for 179 
AC, Pr1(¬p|¬q) = Pr1(¬p, ¬q)/Pr1(¬q) = .5/.6 = .833. As we will see in the sequel, developing 180 
                                                 
 
5  We use “Pr0” to “Pr1” generically in this paper to refer to the JPDs that capture a reasoner’s 
beliefs before, Pr0, and after, Pr1, receiving information relevant to changing their beliefs about the 
conditional premise. 
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this approach to provide a theory of inference at the computational and algorithmic levels does 181 
not alter the predictions we now derive for our experiments using the concept of a contrast set. 182 
 183 
Contrary Negation: Contrast Sets  184 
Suppose Peter and Mary are discussing how Johnny travelled to Manchester. Peter says Johnny 185 
travelled to Manchester by car. As we have seen, Mary can deny Peter’s assertion either using an 186 
explicit negation, Johnny did not travel to Manchester by car or an implicit negation, Johnny 187 
travelled to Manchester by train. In speech, for the former to make the same point as the latter, 188 
the stress must fall on car, so that Mary is interpreted to mean that Johnny travelled to 189 
Manchester by some other mode of transport (Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). It is 190 
a member of this contrast set (other modes of transport) that Mary can use to implicitly deny 191 
Peter’s assertion without using a negation.6 192 
The philosophical and linguistic depiction of negation as otherness—negated statements 193 
make a positive reference to something other than the negated proposition—can be traced back 194 
to Plato and to Aristotle’s account of contrary negation (Horn, 1989). The variety of ways in 195 
which people can use and express negation in natural languages (Horn, 1989) means that 196 
identifying contrast sets could not be their sole function. However, they can explain polarity 197 
biases (Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992; Oaksford, et al., 2000; Schroyens, 198 
                                                 
 
6 Contrast sets are also highly context sensitive and ad hoc (Barsalou, 1983; Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford & 
Stenning, 1992). They may also depend on category structure that relates to individuals like John (Barsalou, 
Huttenlocher, & Lamberts, 1998). So, if John’s trip originated in Dublin or Peter and Mary are talking about it in 
Dublin rather than in London, airplane might more readily come to mind. Conversational pragmatics, cognitive and 
deictic context, and intonation, can all cue the ad hoc reference class (modes of transport for conveying people for 
moderate distances over land or sea) against which various contrast set members that can play the same causal role 
will be more (car) or less (bike) probable (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992).  
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Verschueren, Schaeken & d’Ydewalle, 2000), and they may be able explain the implicit 199 
negations effect. 200 
 201 
Table 2.  202 
A joint probability distribution for implicit negations. 203 
 204 
 q1 q2 q3 Total 
p1 0.30 (15) 0.04 (3) 0.06 (2) 0.40 (20) 
p2 0.10 (5) 0.04 (1) 0.02 (2) 0.16 (8) 
p3 0.00 (0) 0.22 (11) 0.22 (11) 0.44 (22) 
Total 0.40 (20) 0.30 (15) 0.30 (15) 1.00 (50) 
 205 
Note. Frequencies of occurrence in the learning trials in Experiment 1 are shown in brackets. 206 
 207 
Contrast sets explain this effect by their internal probabilistic structure (Oaksford & 208 
Chater, 2007; Oaksford et al., 2000). For example, suppose you know some more details about 209 
Johnny’s travelling habits. You already know that he usually travels to Manchester by train (see, 210 
Contradictory Negation). Suppose you also know that he rarely travels to Paris but mostly goes 211 
by train (but occasionally by plane or ferry), and that when he travels to Dublin, which he does 212 
quite frequently, he only takes the plane or ferry. These facts are captured by the JPD in Table 2, 213 
where, p1 = Manchester, p2 = Paris, p3 = Dublin, q1 = train, q2 = ferry, q3 = plane. This table 214 
expands Pr1 in Table 1 to include knowledge of contrast set members. That is, destinations to 215 
which Johnny travels other than Manchester and modes of transport that he uses other than the 216 
train. 217 
As for Pr1 in Table 1, knowing the distribution in Table 2 may lead someone to accept (1). 218 
On being told Johnny did not travel to Manchester, they should then still endorse the conclusion 219 
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of the MP inference on (1), he did not take the train, quite strongly, because in the JPD in Table 220 
2, Pr(¬q|¬p) = (Pr(p2, q2) + Pr(p2, q3) + Pr(p3, q2) + Pr(p3, q3))/(Pr(p2) + Pr(p3)) = .5/.6 = .833. 221 
However, if told that Johnny travelled to Paris, then the probability that he did not take the train, 222 
Pr(¬q|p2) = (Pr(p2, q2) + Pr(p2, q3))/Pr(p2) = .06/.16 =.375, which predicts much lower 223 
endorsement of MP. We would expect an implicit negations effect.  224 
All other theories of the implicit negation effect argue that it arises solely from using an 225 
implicit negation, regardless of probabilistic structure. However, Table 2 suggests that we should 226 
be able remove the effect even when using an implicit negation in the categorical premise. If q3, 227 
he travelled by plane, is used to affirm the consequent of (1), ¬q1, then Table 2 does not predict 228 
an implicit negation effect for AC for this conditional. In this JPD, Pr(¬p|¬q) = (Pr(p2, q2) + 229 
Pr(p2, q3) + Pr(p3, q2) + Pr(p3, q3))/(Pr(q2) + Pr(q3)) = .833, and Pr(¬p|q3) = (Pr(p2, q3) + Pr(p3, 230 
q3))/Pr(q3) = .24/.30  = .80. Consequently, whether using an explicit negation (AC-Not) or an 231 
implicit negation drawn from the contrast set (AC-Con), people should endorse AC almost 232 
equally often. This prediction, that the implicit negations effect depends on probabilistic 233 
structure, discriminates the probabilistic contrast set theory from all other theories. 234 
 235 
Experience: Manipulating Probabilities 236 
Testing these predictions requires manipulating probabilities. Reasoning researchers have 237 
manipulated probabilities in many ways, using pre-tested content (Oaksford, et al., 2000; 238 
Oaksford, Chater, & Grainger, 1999), frequency formats (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) 239 
combined with concrete visualizations (stacks of cards) (Oaksford, et al., 1997, 1999), 240 
contingency tables, or “probabilistic truth tables” (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Oberauer & 241 
Wlihelm, 2003), as in causal judgement (Ward & Jenkins, 1965), a procedure that has also been 242 
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reversed so participants construct the contingency table given a conditional (Oaksford & 243 
Mousakowski, 2004; Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003; Oberauer, 2006; Over, Hadjichristidis, 244 
Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007), and sequential tasks where trial frequency reflects the 245 
probabilities (Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayrhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Oaksford & Mousakowski, 2004; 246 
Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003), and where learning effects are observed (for critiques, see Jubin 247 
& Barrouillet, 2019; Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Hőrnig, 2004). In these experiments, we used 248 
experiential learning of probabilities, which leads to improved performance in judgment and 249 
decision-making, and which has not used before in reasoning research. 250 
 There is an ongoing debate in judgment and decision-making about the description-251 
experience gap (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). The distinction is between using verbal 252 
descriptions of decision options or prospects, and allowing probabilities and utilities to be 253 
learned trial-by-trial. One key difference is that people’s decision-making seems to be more 254 
rational (optimal) with experiential learning, “people are more likely to maximize the 255 
experienced mean reward than to maximize the expected value in description” (Wulf et al., 2018, 256 
p. 160). Improved performance is also found in probabilistic judgement in general, “even the 257 
statistically naïve achieved accurate probabilistic inferences after experiencing sequentially 258 
simulated outcomes, and many preferred this presentation format” (Hogarth & Soyer, 2011, 259 
p.434). Experiential learning seems to allow people to pick up information about utilities and 260 
probabilities more readily than descriptions.7  261 
 No other theory of the implicit negations effect predicts that learning about 262 
probabilistically structured contrast sets should be able to create or remove this effect. As we 263 
                                                 
 
7 We provided a similar motivation, based on natural sampling (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Kleiter, 
1994), for using sequential selection tasks (Oaksford & Moussakowski, 2004; Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003). 
EXPLAINING THE IMPLICIT NEGATIONS EFFECT IN CONDITIONAL INFERENCE 15 
show in the sequel, all these theories assume that people are attempting to build a mental 264 
representation of the logical structure of the premises, which include contradictory logical 265 
operators. They are assumed to attempt to draw inferences over these representations using a 266 
learned or innate logical competence. Implicit negations are assumed only to disrupt the process 267 
of building the appropriate logical representation of the surface linguistic forms of the premises. 268 
However, we need some caution about the extent to which experience based learning 269 
leads to performance consistent with normative theories. In probability judgements based on 270 
Bayes’ theorem, samples from the posterior distribution yield close to normative answers 271 
because they are most relevant to the question at hand. That is, for example, what is the posterior 272 
probability of a woman having cancer given a positive mammogram? (Hogarth & Soyer, 2011). 273 
Samples from the prior distribution, showing very few women have breast cancer, are less 274 
relevant and lead to fewer normative responses (Hawkins, Hayes, Donkin, Pasqualino, & 275 
Newell, 2015). Moreover, summary descriptions of the posterior sample produce median 276 
responses even closer to the normative response (Hawkins et al., 2015). 277 
In conditional inference, the most relevant distribution from which we could provide 278 
samples are the conditional probabilities that correspond to people’s predicted degree of belief in 279 
the conclusion of the inferences MP, DA, AC, and MT (see Table 3 below). However, as for 280 
probability judgement, providing such samples is rather too close to giving participants the 281 
probabilistically correct answer (Hawkins et al., 2015). Although we wanted to exploit the 282 
potential benefits of trial-by-trial sampling, we also wanted to assess people’s ability to 283 
extrapolate from information that they might experience in the real world. Therefore, we used 284 
experiential trial-by-trial learning of the JPD in Table 2, to get participants to revise their default 285 
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prior beliefs, Pr0, to a new distribution, Pr1, which implements the focused manipulations that 286 
test our account of the implicit negation effect.  287 
In the sequel, we argue that participants learn a representation like a Bayes net over 288 
which they draw inferences just as in causal judgement people are assumed to learn causal 289 
strengths from similar learning trials (Ward & Jenkins, 1965). We used a discrete learning task 290 
where, using our example, participants observe a series of destination/mode of transport pairs 291 
(Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Hattori & Oaksford, 2007). The trial-by-trial approach has been used 292 
only once before in studying conditional reasoning (Pollard & Evans, 1983). However, those 293 
experiments used a continuous rather than a discrete format (Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Hattori & 294 
Oaksford, 2007) that focuses attention on the conditional probabilities like providing samples 295 
from these distributions (Oaksford & Chater, 1996). We also assess the extent to which people 296 
acquire the appropriate distribution by having them reconstruct the contingency table in Table 2.  297 
  298 
Experiment 1: MP Manipulation 299 
There have been no empirical investigations of the probabilistic contrast set account of the 300 
implicit negation effect. Our first experiment used a learning phase where participants sample the 301 
distribution in Table 2 to revise their beliefs (as in the transition from Pr0 to Pr1). The 302 
experimental design makes it clear that this sample is from the same population as experienced 303 
by an informant who asserts (1) as the major premise of the conditional inferences that 304 
participants must then evaluate. Consequently, after the learning phase, participants should be in 305 
a similar state of belief as the informant asserting the major premise. Following on from our 306 
discussion in Probabilities and Contrast Sets, the first hypothesis we tested was: 307 
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Hypothesis 1. With contrast sets structured as in Table 2, according to the probabilistic 308 
theory, but no other, we should observe an implicit negation effect for MP but not AC. So 309 
an interaction is predicted in which MP-Not > MP-Con, AC-Not = AC-Con, MP-Con < 310 
AC-Con, and AC-Not = MP-Not. 311 
In this experiment, participants drew inferences before and after the learning phase. We 312 
presented single event probability descriptions (e.g., 0.8 or 80%) before the pre-learning 313 
inference task. In this phase, we predicted that we would observe the default implicit negations 314 
effect, based on the default prior (Pr0), for these materials. Previous evidence showed an implicit 315 
negation effect for this conditional (if ¬p, then ¬q) for both MP (MP-Con [44%] < MP-Not 316 
[89%]) and AC (AC-Con [11%] < AC-Not [61%]) (Evans & Handley, 1999, Experiment 3). 317 
Moreover, in a meta-analysis of previous results, the sample size weighted mean decrease in 318 
percentage endorsements for explicit vs implicit negations was 42% for MP, and 57% for AC 319 
(Evans & Handley, 1999; Schroyens et al., 2000). Consequently, in this experiment we also 320 
tested Hypothesis 2: 321 
Hypothesis 2. In the pre-learning inference task, there will be a greater implicit negation 322 
effect for AC than MP.   323 
From our Bayesian perspective, people’s default prior probability distribution, Pr0, causes this 324 
effect because it differs from Table 2. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the learning task will overcome 325 
this default prior and, in the post learning inference task, reveal an effect for MP but not for AC. 326 
We also countenance the possibility that in a novel context, people do not apply informative 327 
priors based on prior knowledge but use relatively weak uninformative priors.  328 
 In decision making, using participants’ subjective estimates of learned probabilities, also 329 
provides better fits to the data than objective values (Jarvstad et al, 2013). Consequently, in these 330 
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experiments, on completing the inference task, we asked participants to perform a probability 331 
verification task where they reconstructed the JPD in Table 2. This procedure allowed us to 332 
check how well participants had learned this distribution by computing the correlation with the 333 
objective values. Splitting participants in to high and low correlation groups will also allow us to 334 
see how well the probabilities are learned affects inference. We also used these joint probabilities 335 
to calculate the relevant conditional probabilities for each inference. We could then test how well 336 
these subjective calculated conditional probabilities predicted inference task performance, which 337 
leads to our third hypothesis: 338 
Hypothesis 3. The subjective probability estimates for Table 2, when used to calculate the 339 
appropriate conditional probabilities, should be good predictors of the odds of endorsing 340 
an inference in the inference task, although how well the JPD is learned might moderate 341 
this effect. 342 
 We also asked participants to rate their confidence in their inference judgements. In these 343 
experiments, we asked participants for a categorical judgement, do you endorse the conclusion or 344 
its negation? In much previous (e.g., Oaksford et al, 2000) and recent research (Skovgaard-345 
Olsen, Collins, Krzyżanowska, Hahn, & Klauer, 2019), participants are asked to rate how sure or 346 
confident they are in, or the extent they agree with, a conclusion. When rescaled, researchers 347 
often treat these ratings as proxies for probabilities in subsequent model fitting exercises. 348 
Research in decision-making has shown that confidence moderates the strength of the relation 349 
between value and choice (e.g., De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013). We therefore also 350 
investigated two further mutually exclusive hypotheses: 351 
Hypothesis 4. Subjective probability will directly predict confidence, or 352 
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Hypothesis 4′. Confidence will moderate the strength of the relation between subjective 353 
probability and inference.  354 
 355 
Analysis Strategy 356 
 We analyzed our data using Bayesian statistics (McElreath, 2016; Gelman, Carlin, Stern, 357 
Dunson, Vehtari, & Rubin, 2013). 358 
 Data analysis. All analyses used Bayesian regression implemented in the rstanarm 359 
package in R (Goodrich, Gabry, Ali, Brilleman, 2018; R Core Team, 2018). We analyzed 360 
continuous dependent variables (computed conditional probabilities and confidence) using the 361 
stan_lmer function. We analyzed the binary inference data with the stan_glm and stan_glmer 362 
functions with a logit link function depending on whether the experiments introduced additional 363 
random variables.  364 
 Comparing means. We used the R packages tidybayes (Kay, 2019) and emmeans 365 
(Lenth, 2019), to generate samples for each marginal mean. When comparing means, we 366 
assumed a region of practical equivalence (ROPE, Kruschke, 2011) of 0 ± 0.1×SD of the 367 
differences, and report the proportion of the distribution of differences falling outside the ROPE.  368 
This procedure avoids the unrealistic assumption of a point null hypothesis. We report this 369 
statistic, where the proportion is p, as “p ∉ ROPE”.8 We also computed Cohen’s d for each 370 
comparison. For all means and differences, we report the 95% highest density interval (HDI) in 371 
square brackets.  372 
                                                 
 
8 To be precise, we calculated differences as highest minus lowest mean so that the proportion we report is 
always the proportion greater than 0.1×SD.  
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Comparing models. To answer specific research questions, we frequently compare 373 
different models of the data. We do not report Bayes factors for these comparisons (or when 374 
comparing means), because of the problems for this approach created by non-informative 375 
improper priors (see, McElreath, 2016 p. 192; Gelman, et al., 2013, pp. 182-4). We based all 376 
model comparisons on expected predictive accuracy (Gelman, et al., 2013: Ch. 7). We compare 377 
models using the leave-one-out information criterion (LOOIC), which provides an estimate of 378 
the pointwise divergence between the predicted posterior distribution and the data (Vehtari, 379 
Gelman, & Gabry, 2017), using the loo package in R (Vehtari, Gabry, Yao, Gelman, 2019). We 380 
also report Bayesian stacking weights, which are the best fitting weights assigned to the models 381 
if they were averaged to best predict the data (Yao, Vehtari, Simpson, & Gelman, 2018). 382 
 Data visualization. For categorical predictors, estimated marginal means of a posterior 383 
distribution were all plotted using the afex_plot function from the afex package in R (Singmann, 384 
Bolker, Westfall, & Aust, 2019). For continuous predictors, we plotted the data using sjPlot 385 
(Lüdecke, 2018). 386 
 387 
Method 388 
Participants. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (2017). Sample 389 
size was determined both classically (Chow, Shao, & Wang, 2008) and by Bayesian estimation 390 
using the propdiff.mblacc function from the SampleSizeProportions package in R (Joseph, du 391 
Berger, & Belisle, 1997). Previous data from Evans and Handley (1999) for the AC inference on 392 
if ¬p then ¬q was used to estimate effects size.  Maintaining a 5% chance of a Type 1 error and a 393 
20% chance of Type 2 error, led to very different required sample sizes; classical: 22 (11 in each 394 
group), Bayesian: 244 (122 in each group). One of our key predictions is an interaction, and 395 
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reliably estimating interactions requires sixteen times more data than main effects (Gelman, 396 
2018).  Consequently, recruitment aimed for a sample size of between 250 and 300.  397 
All participants who completed the experiment received a small payment (between 398 
US$0.50 and US$1.00). Some responses were excluded because they may have been duplicates, 399 
either sharing an MTurk ID or an IP address. After exclusions, the sample size was 272. 52% 400 
were female and the sample was aged between 18 and 75 with a median age of 31 years (mean = 401 
34.34, SD = 11.94). English was the first language of 97% of participants. 402 
Design and materials. The experiment was a 6 (Inference and Negation [InfNeg]: MP-403 
Not, MP-Con, AC-Not, AC-Con, DA, MT) by 2 (learning phase: Pre, Post) completely within 404 
subjects design. MP and AC were presented in both explicit (Not) and implicit (Con) forms. DA 405 
and MT were included as filler items in this experiment and as a further check on participants’ 406 
understanding of Table 2. 407 
The materials concerned the proportion of animals that a vet sees of different species 408 
(cats, dogs, rabbits) and colours (black, white, brown). These were varied in accordance with 409 
Table 1, with p1 = cats, p2 = dogs p3 = rabbits, q1 = black, q2 = brown, q3 = white. Participants also 410 
performed a conditional inference task at two points in the experiment. The conditional or major 411 
premise had a negated antecedent and consequent (if ¬p1 then ¬q1). Participants were told: 412 
“The vet is considering the following rule about the animals that she sees: 413 
If it is not a cat, then it is not black. 414 
The vet is told that the next animal she will see is: 415 
One of the following categorical or minor premises was presented for each question: not a cat 416 
(MP-Not), a dog (MP-Con), not black (AC-Not), white (AC-Con), a cat (DA), and black (MT). 417 
Participants were then asked:  418 
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“Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude about the 419 
next animal.” 420 
Responses were gathered using a 2AFC procedure with the alternatives determined by the 421 
inference: 422 
 MP and DA alternatives:  AC and MT alternatives: 423 
That the animal is not black  That the animal is not a cat 424 
That the animal is black  That the animal is a cat 425 
The alternatives in each pair were presented in random order. According to Table 1, the 426 
probability that participants should draw each inference is shown in Table 3. 427 
 428 
Table 3 429 
The Probabilities of Drawing Each Inference in Experiment 1 430 
 Negation 
Inf. Explicit (Not) Implicit (Con) 
MP .833 (Pr(¬q1|¬p1)) .375 (Pr(¬q1|p2)) 
AC .833 (Pr(¬p1|¬q1)) .800 (Pr(¬p1|q3)) 
DA .750 (Pr(q1|p1))  
MT .750 (Pr(p1|q1))  
 431 
Note: Inf. = Inference 432 
 433 
The experiment also included a learning phase with 50 trials. Each trial consisted of a 434 
photograph of one of the 50 animal/colour pairings shown in Table 1. Each photograph showed 435 
only the animal against a white background. Each of the 50 photographs was unique. So, for 436 
example, participants would see 15 different black cats, and so on. The photographs were 437 
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cropped and re-sized so that they were the same size and fitted on to a single screen at typical 438 
resolution for online presentation. The pictures were presented in random order. To try and 439 
ensure that participants attended to the stimuli, on each trial, the participant had to answer two 440 
questions with three response options each: What type of animal is this? (Dog, Cat, Rabbit), and 441 
What colour best describes this animal? (Black, White, Brown). 442 
Procedure. This experiment was implemented in surveygizmo 443 
(www.surveygizmo.com), to which participants were directed from MTurk (www.mturk.com). 444 
Participants first saw an information screen and had to confirm consent by clicking a check box 445 
to proceed. All experiments received ethical approval from the Department of Psychological 446 
Sciences, Research Ethics Committee. Participants then provided basic demographic 447 
information. This part of the experiment was common to all experiments reported here. 448 
In the first pre-learning phase of the experiment participants were provided with the 449 
proportion of animals that the vet sees of different species (cats, dogs, rabbits) and colours 450 
(black, white, brown) as in the cell entries in Table 2. Participants then carried out the pre-451 
learning phase inference task. Each of the six inference questions, including the opening 452 
information containing the conditional rule, were presented on a single page in random order. 453 
Participants provided a response and then moved a slider bar to indicate their confidence in their 454 
response. The slider bar was labelled ‘Not at all confident’ at one end and ‘Completely confident’ 455 
at the other. Responses were recorded as a number between 1 and 100. Participants were not able 456 
to move to the next page until both responses had been made.  457 
The participants were then given instructions for the learning phase, as in the Design and 458 
Materials section, where they were told they would see a sample of the animals that the vet sees 459 
in the surgery. Participants then performed the post-learning phase inference task, this time with 460 
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no information about the proportion of animals. Finally, participants were presented with a 461 
probability verification task to check how accurately they could reconstruct the probability 462 
distribution in Table 2. Each participants’ subjective conditional probabilities of drawing each 463 
inference could then be calculated. This task consisted of nine response boxes in a three by three 464 
grid labelled animal type (cat, dog, rabbit) on one axis and colour (black, white, brown) on the 465 
other, as in Table 2. Participants were instructed to enter how many of the next 100 animals that 466 
the vet would see would be in each category (a similar procedure was used in Oaksford & 467 
Wakefield, 2003). If participants attempted to proceed without their responses summing to 100, 468 
they were returned to this page with an instruction to make sure their responses did add up to 100 469 
and were provided with the total value they initially entered for guidance. 470 
A final page provided participants with a code to enter in MTurk to confirm that they had 471 
completed the experiment, thanked them for their time, and provided contact details if they had 472 
any questions. 473 
 474 
Results and Discussion 475 
Attention test. The attention test in the learning task involved naming the animal and 476 
colour on each trial. With fifty trials, each participant could make up to 100 errors. The mean 477 
error rate was less than 1% (.70, SD = 2.26). Only 37 participants (13.6%) made more than 1 478 
error and out of these only one made more than 8. This participant made 33 errors. We concluded 479 
that most participants paid attention to the stimuli in the learning task and it was not necessary to 480 
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Figure 1 485 
Joint Probabilities and Calculated Conditional Probabilities from the Probability Verification 486 
Task in Experiment 1 487 
 488 
Note. A. Box-plots for the verification judgements for all cells of Table 1. B. Mean calculated 489 
conditional probabilities for each inference based on the estimates shown in panel A split by 490 
correlation with the objective values, error bars = 95% HDI; model: Cond ~ InfNeg*Corr . In 491 
both panels, the large dark grey points indicate the objective probabilities based on Table 1. 492 
 493 
Probability verification task. We first report the results of the probability verification 494 
task. Figure 1A shows the box-plots for each cell in Table 2 and the objective values for each 495 
cell. We used the standard letter labelling of cells in a contingency table used in causal learning 496 
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(Hattori & Oaksford, 2007). Errors for low probabilities can only push in one direction and all 497 
cell values must sum to 1. Therefore, unsurprisingly, lower objective values tended to be 498 
overestimated and higher values underestimated. The mean correlation between each 499 
participant’s estimates and the objective values was r(7) = .59 (SD = .33). We split participants 500 
into high and low correlation groups (Corr); high correlation (≥ median): mean r(7) = .81 (SD 501 
= .11, N = 148), and low correlation (< median): mean r(7) = .32 (SD = .30, N = 124). By this 502 
measure, there was a large group of participants who showed a good understanding of the 503 
underlying probabilities, but also a group who did not, sometimes showing negative correlations 504 
with the objective values. 505 
We then used the estimated values from the probability verification task to compute the 506 
conditional probabilities (Cond) for each inference. There were occasional missing data points 507 
because of problems of division by zero. To maintain the coherence of the computed conditional 508 
probabilities, rather than impute the missing values, we added .01 to the offending cell(s) in a 509 
participants subjective JPD and took .01 from the highest cell value(s). We had to make this 510 
adjustment for only 3 participants and 0.49% of cell values and it did not alter the correlations 511 
with the objective values. We show the calculated conditional probabilities in Figure 1B, with the 512 
data split into high and low correlation groups.  513 
Figure 1B shows the estimated marginal means of the posterior distribution (see figure 514 
caption for the model). For the high correlation group, MP-Con (mean = .59, 95% HDI = 515 
[.57, .62]) was lower than MP-Not (mean = .80 [.78, .82], ?̅? = 8.20 [5.88, 10.47], 1.0 ∉ ROPE). 516 
Exactly the same pattern of differences was observed between MP-Con and the remaining four 517 
inferences, AC-Not (mean = .79 [.77, .82], ?̅?  = 14.90 [12.65, 17.31]), AC-Con (mean = .77 518 
[.75, .79], ?̅?  = 13.64 [11.28, 15.93]), DA (mean = .69 [.67, .72], ?̅?  = 7.69 [5.36, 9.98]), and MT 519 
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(mean = .70 [.68, .72], ?̅?  = 8.20 [5.88, 10.48]). For all comparisons, 1.0 ∉ ROPE. There were no 520 
differences between MP-Not, AC-Not or AC-Con (< .93 ∉ ROPE for all comparisons). For the 521 
AC-Not vs AC-Con comparison 0 was a credible value for the effect size, ?̅?  = 1.55 [-.77, 3.77]. 522 
However, all these inferences differed from DA and MT (1.0 ∉ ROPE for all comparisons), 523 
although DA and MT did not differ from each other (.61 ∉ ROPE). Although the differences 524 
were smaller, the same basic pattern occurred for MP-Not, MP-Con, AC-Not, and AC-Con for 525 
the low correlation group. However, DA (mean = .48 [.45, .50]) and MT (mean = .53 [.51, .55]) 526 
were much lower in the low correlation group than the high correlation group (1.0 ∉ ROPE for 527 
both comparisons). In summary, for the high correlation group, the calculated conditional 528 
probabilities based on the verification task produced the predicted manipulation such that 529 
Pr(¬q1|¬p1) (MP-Not) > Pr(¬q1|p2) (MP-Con), and Pr(¬p1|¬q1) (AC-Not) ≈ Pr(¬p1|q3) (AC-Con).   530 
Inference Tasks. We first looked at the results for the pre-learning inference task with 531 
inference (AC, MP) and negation (Not, Con) as categorical predictors. The effect for AC was 532 
larger than the effect for MP. AC-Con (mean = .82 [.77, .86]) was lower than AC-Not (mean 533 
= .87 [.83, .91]) but zero was still a credible value for the difference (?̅?  = 2.14 [-.51, 5.06], .94 ∉ 534 
ROPE) but only marginally. In contrast, although MP-Con (mean = .83 [.79, .88]) was lower 535 
than MP-Not (mean = .86 [.82, .90]) zero was a credible value for the difference (?̅?  = 1.3 [-1.31, 536 
4.13], .80 ∉ ROPE). No differences were observed between any of the other inferences (0 was a 537 
credible value for all differences and < .92 ∉ ROPE for all comparisons). The results of the pre-538 
learning inference task were consistent with default expectations derived from previous research 539 
where the implicit negation effect is larger for AC than MP, thereby providing some support for 540 
Hypothesis 2. It means that the learning task based on Table 1 must overcome this default prior 541 
to reveal the effects predicted by Hypothesis 1. 542 
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Figure 2 543 
The Results of the Post-Learning Inference Phase in Experiment 1 544 
 545 
Notes. A The probability of endorsing each inference for the high and low correlation groups, 546 
error bars = 95% HDI; B. The probability of endorsing an inference predicted by the calculated 547 
conditional probability for the high and low correlation groups; C. The relationship between 548 
calculated conditional probability and confidence for the high correlation group showing density 549 
plots for each variable; D. The probability of endorsing an inference predicted by the calculated 550 
conditional probability for the high correlation group with high and low confidence. 551 
 552 
We first fitted a model to the post learning phase inference task, using inference/negation 553 
and correlation as categorical predictors. The estimated marginal means are shown in Figure 2A. 554 
We then looked at the interaction between inference (Inf: MP and AC) and negation (Neg: Not, 555 
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Con) for the high correlation group.  We compared two models, one which included the 556 
interaction (M1), and one with only the main effects (M2) (see, Table 4 Note). Δelpd and the 557 
Bayesian stacking weights converged on identifying M2 as the best model. It provides the most 558 
efficient compression of the data by minimizing the loss of information using the fewest 559 
parameters. This result suggests that we have failed to observe the predicted interaction.  560 
However, Δelpd indicates that there was only a small difference between models. M2 is 561 
weighted more heavily because it is simpler, having fewer parameters. Moreover, estimating 562 
interactions requires sixteen times more data than main effects (Gelman, 2018), as we noted in 563 
the Participants section. The simple effects were as predicted. MP-Con (mean = .84 [.79, .88]) 564 
was lower than MP-Not (mean = .93 [.89, .97]) ]) (?̅? = 3.71 [.63, 4.46], .99 ∉ ROPE) and AC-565 
Con (mean = .94 [.90, .98])  (?̅? = 4.03 [1.22, 6.75], .99 ∉ ROPE). However, zero was a credible 566 
value for the difference between AC-Not (mean = .97 [.94, .99]) and AC-Con (?̅? = 1.57 [-1.30, 567 
4.24], .85 ∉ ROPE) and MP-Not (?̅? = 1.86 [-.91, 4.75], .89 ∉ ROPE).  568 
 569 
Table 4 570 
Model Comparison for Predicting Post-Learning Inference Endorsement Rates in Experiment 1 571 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
M1 324.1 32.3 4.1 1.8 .9 .5 0 
M2 322.3 32.0 3.0 0 0 0 1.0 
 572 
Note. M1: Endorse ~ Inf*Neg, M2: Endorse ~ Inf + Neg. Estimated number of parameters (k), 573 
the difference (ΔLOOIC), the difference in expected log posterior predictive density (Δelpd) and 574 
its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian stacking weights (LOOIC-weight).  575 
 576 
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There was only one difference for the low correlation group. AC-Con (mean = .79 577 
[.72, .86]) was lower than AC-Not (mean = .89 [.83, .94]) (?̅? = 2.15 [.13, 4.02], .98 ∉ ROPE). 578 
This effect is consistent with the default prior effect we derived from previous results and the 579 
results of the pre-learning inference task. It suggests that even though most participants attended 580 
to the learning task, the low correlation group did not learn from it and reverted to the default 581 
prior.  582 
The results for the high correlation group confirmed Hypothesis 1. An implicit negation 583 
effect can be created (MP) and removed (AC) by varying the underlying probability distribution 584 
from which the relevant conditional probabilities are computed. These results are not consistent 585 
with other theories of the implicit negations effect. 586 
Calculated conditional probabilities. We next tested whether the calculated conditional 587 
probabilities (Cond) were good predictors of responses in the inference task (Endorse). We also 588 
tested whether these probabilities were better predictors of participants’ responses than the 589 
logical categorization of the inferences involved. According to other theories, peoples’ responses 590 
are driven solely by the logical characterization of the inference involved and whether an explicit 591 
or implicit negation is used to express the categorical premise, which is the model we fitted to 592 
test Hypothesis 1 (M1). We can compare M1 to a model that uses only the calculated conditional 593 
probabilities to predict responses (M3). Fitting this model is equivalent to a repeated measures 594 
regression as each participant provides multiple pairs of values (for the current data the six 595 
Cond/Endorse pairs for each level of InfNeg) (Bakdash & Marusich, 2017). In hierarchical 596 
mixed effects models this is achieved by specifying a different intercept for each participant with 597 
the same slope, the population slope (see, Table 5, Note for model specifications). We also fitted 598 
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a foil model (M4), which included just the intercepts to test that including calculated conditional 599 
probability provided more accurate predictions. 600 
 601 
Table 5.  602 
Model Comparison for Predicting Endorsement Rates from Calculated Conditional Probabilities 603 
in Experiment 1 604 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
M3 1010.7 50.9 92.5 0 0 0 .89 
M4 1038.7 51.8 90.3 -28.0 -14.0 6.0 0 
M1 1099.3 52.9 12.6 -88.6 -44.3 11.1 .11 
 605 
Note. M3: Endorse ~ Cond*Corr + (1|Participant). M4: Endorse ~ Corr + (1|Participant). 606 
Estimated number of parameters (k), the difference (ΔLOOIC), the difference in expected log 607 
posterior predictive density (Δelpd) and its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian stacking 608 
weights (LOOIC-weight).  609 
 610 
Table 5 shows the results of the model comparison. The stacking weights and Δelpd 611 
converged on identifying M3 as the best model.  One could argue that M3 provides the better fit 612 
because it contains more parameters (k). However, Bayesian indices of fit, like LOOIC and BIC, 613 
heavily penalize model complexity (many parameters), and far more than conventional fit 614 
indices, like AIC9. Consequently, that M3 still provides a much better fit is impressive. 615 
Moreover, the calculated conditional probabilities are parameter free estimates of the probability 616 
                                                 
 
9 There is a balance to be struck between too many parameters and too few (McElreath, 2016). Too few 
means important patterns in the data cannot be captured. Too many leads to overfitting, which means that removing 
data points can lead to large changes in the model’s predictions. LOOIC assesses  this balance by systematically 
testing fits by leaving one out and ensuring predictions do not radically alter. So that M3 produces the lowest 
LOOIC value indicates that overfitting is not a problem despite having a greater number of parameters. 
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of endorsing each inference according to the probabilistic contrast set model. It provides a much 617 
better fit because it uniquely predicts the difference between MP-Con and AC-Con. These results 618 
confirm Hypothesis 3. 619 
Figure 2B shows the relation between calculated conditional probability and endorsement 620 
rates for the high and low correlation groups for M3. Interpreting slopes and interactions is 621 
problematic in generalized linear models (Tsai & Gill, 2013). Parameters are estimated after a 622 
non-linear logit (i.e., log-odds) transformation of the model. Describing the effects is most 623 
interpretable by transforming the dependent variable to odds. The slope for the high correlation 624 
group was 129.86 [5.25, 393.63] (b > 0, .97 ∉ ROPE), that is, a .1 increase in calculated 625 
conditional probability increases the odds that an inference will be endorsed by 13. For the low 626 
correlation group, the slope was 4.02 [.75, 9.02] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE), that is, a .1 increase in 627 
calculated conditional probability increases the odds by .4. The intercept for the high correlation 628 
group was 1.29 [.21, 2.94], indicating that when the calculated conditional probability was zero, 629 
an inference was still marginally more likely to be endorsed than rejected. For the low 630 
correlation group the intercept was 4.74 [.41, 12.28]. Intercepts did not differ between groups (?̅? 631 
= -1.19 [-.4.32, 1.22], .78 ∉ ROPE), but the slope for the high correlation group was steeper than 632 
for the low (?̅? = 1.11 [.002, 3.44], .95 ∉ ROPE). 633 
These results suggest that correlation plays a moderating role. Participants in the high 634 
correlation group were more sensitive (lower intercept, higher slope) to changes in the predicted 635 
conditional probability when deciding whether to endorse a conclusion than those in the low 636 
correlation group. However, there was considerable uncertainty about this relationship for low 637 
conditional probabilities. The right hand subplot in Figure 2C shows the density plot for the 638 
calculated conditional probabilities. It is skewed towards the upper end of the scale. 639 
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Consequently, there were far fewer responses at the lower end explaining the increased 640 
uncertainty. 641 
Confidence. We next assessed the relationship between confidence and the calculated 642 
conditional probabilities using the model Confidence ~ Cond + (1|Participant). Figure 2C shows 643 
that they are linearly related. The population slope was 15.38 [10.22, 20.15] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE) 644 
indicating that a 0.1 increase in conditional probability lead to 1.54 [1.5, 3.1] point rise in 645 
confidence. Both distributions were skewed to the high end of the scale (see subplots in Figure 646 
2C), and they had median values at the same point (conditional probability: .69; confidence: 69). 647 
Consistent with this correlation, Figure 2D shows that the median split on confidence (ConfSplit) 648 
produced a slightly higher intercept when confidence was high without a change in slope (model: 649 
Endorse ~ Cond*ConfSplit + (1|Participant)). However, zero was a credible value for the 650 
differences between high and low response groups for both the slope and the intercept.  These 651 
results were not consistent with confidence moderating the effect of conditional probability on 652 
endorsements. These results, therefore, confirm Hypothesis 4, but disconfirm Hypothesis 4′. 653 
Possible criticisms. Before summarising, we consider two possible criticisms of this 654 
experiment.  First, the 2AFC response mode may result in more polarized results, perhaps 655 
favouring a probabilistic explanation. Response mode can alter response patterns in conditional 656 
inference, but not by very much (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995; Evans & Handley, 1999; 657 
Oaksford & Chater, 2010a; Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2001). The 2AFC procedure is 658 
similar to evaluation tasks where participants see the valid conclusion and its negation separately 659 
and are asked for an endorse decision (Marcus & Rips, 1979; Oaksford, et al., 2000). The current 660 
procedure combines these separate choices (which, in the aggregate, sum to 1, see Oaksford, et 661 
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al., 2000), into a single decision, and provides no reason to expect endorsement decisions to 662 
diverge from previously used response modes.   663 
Second, one could argue that in the inference tasks, people are ignoring the conditional 664 
premise and are responding solely based on their learned knowledge of the situation. However, 665 
one could level this criticism at any attempt to manipulate people’s subjective probabilities prior 666 
to an inference task in the previous literature. Moreover, the learning phase was short (and were 667 
made even shorter in subsequent experiments) and required only that people labelled the items in 668 
the attention check, but not learn the probabilistic structure to any criterion of accuracy before 669 
proceeding. Finally, of course, this criticism simply begs the question against our Bayesian 670 
account, which assumes that to draw inferences people assign relevant conditional probabilities 671 
to conditionals based on what they know. They are not applying learned or innate logical rules 672 
either syntactically as in mental logic (Rips, 1994), or semantically as in mental models 673 
representations (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  674 
 Summary. The results of Experiment 1 supported our main hypotheses. Providing single 675 
event probabilities for the JPD in Table 2, in the pre-learning phase, led to the standard default 676 
effect predicted from previous research confirming H2. There was an implicit negation effect for 677 
AC but not MP. In contrast, providing experience of these probabilities, via a brief learning 678 
phase, overcame the default priors for the high correlation group consistent with H1. There was 679 
an implicit negation effect for MP but not for AC for participants who had learned the JPD. The 680 
low correlation group continued to draw inferences consistent with the default prior. The 681 
calculated conditional probabilities for each inference, derived from participants’ JPD estimates, 682 
was also the best predictor of the probability of endorsing an inference (H3). Moreover, 683 
confidence was predicted by calculated conditional probability and did not moderate its effect on 684 
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inference endorsement (H4). These results are not consistent with other theories of the implicit 685 
negation effect, which all predict an implicit negation effect for both MP and AC. 686 
 687 
Experiment 2: MP and AC Manipulations 688 
Experiment 1 had some limitations. First, the effects, although statistically reliable with good 689 
effect sizes, were not of the same magnitude observed in the literature on implicit negations. 690 
Moreover, they only occurred for the high correlation group. The low correlation group 691 
continued to show the default effect also seen in the pre-learning inference task. Second, 692 
although the simple effects were all in the predicted direction, we did not observe the predicted 693 
interaction. Third, the distribution of calculated conditional probabilities was skewed toward the 694 
upper end of the scale. Such an effect is difficult to avoid when the objective distribution in the 695 
JPD (Table 2) were constructed to lead to mainly high conditional probabilities.  696 
 697 
Table 6 698 
The distributions of pi (animals/colours) and qi (colours/vehicles) used in Experiment 2. 699 
 MP-Manipulation AC-Manipulation 
 q1 q2 q3 Total q1 q2 q3 Total 
p1 0.27 (8) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.27 (8) 0.27 (8) 0.00 (0) 0.06 (2) 0.33 (10) 
p2 0.06 (2) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.06 (2) 0.00 (0) 0.33 (10) 0.00 (0) 0.33 (10) 
p3 0.00 (0) 0.33 (10) 0.33 (10) 0.67 (20) 0.00 (0) 0.33 (10) 0.00 (0) 0.33 (10) 
Total 0.33 (10) 0.33 (10) 0.33 (10) 1.00 (30) 0.27 (8) 0.67 (2) 0.06 (20) 1.00 (30) 
Note. p1 = cats/white, p2 = dogs/blue, p3 = rabbits/red, q1 = black/van, q2 = brown/car, q3 = 700 
white/motorbike. Frequencies of occurrence in the learning trials using these materials are 701 
shown in brackets. 702 
 703 
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In Experiment 2, we used a more extreme probability manipulation using the JPDs in 704 
Table 6. We also manipulated the JPDs to produce an implicit negation effect for both MP and 705 
AC. These changes address all of the limitations of Experiment 1. According to probabilistic 706 
contrast set theory a stronger probability manipulation should produce a stronger implicit 707 
negation effect. No other theory predicts that this manipulation should have this effect, as they do 708 
not make graded predictions. Moreover, by manipulating probabilities in line with the default 709 
prior for AC, we should be able to produce a stronger effect, one that may reveal the predicted 710 
interaction. By using a more extreme probability manipulation, such that very low calculated 711 
conditional probabilities (i.e., zero) are predicted, we may also be able to produce a less skewed 712 
distribution, allowing less uncertainty about what is happening at the low end of the scale.  713 
We also reduced the number of learning trials from fifty to thirty. The rationale was part 714 
theoretical and part methodological. Theoretically, we have argued that people only build very 715 
limited small-scale statistical models related to their immediate deictic or linguistic context 716 
(Oakford & Chater, 2020a). These models are constructed on the fly (Chater, 2018) based on 717 
linguistic information and prior knowledge, in particular, from immediate past experience, as in 718 
decision by sampling models (Stewart, et al., 2006). People’s need to predict their immediate 719 
environment suggests that they can do so using very few samples (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & 720 
Tenenbaum, 2014). Methodologically, this experiment used two learning phases. Reducing the 721 
number of trials made the experiment more comparable in length to Experiment 1 and less likely 722 
to lead to fatigue effects.  723 
We used two sets of materials and participants performed learning phases following by an 724 
inference phase for each set of materials in counterbalanced order. We did not use pre-learning 725 
inference tasks in this experiment. Consequently, this experiment, and the next, did not evaluate 726 
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Hypothesis 2. Participants performed on the MP manipulation for one set of materials and the 727 
AC manipulation for the other set of materials. The second set of materials used the colours of 728 
motor vehicles and also varied the position of the colour predicates from the consequent to the 729 
antecedent clause (see, Table 6), so that the target double negation rule read if it is not white, then 730 
it is not a van. According to the JPDs in Table 6, the conditional probabilities with which 731 
participants should draw each inference for each manipulation are shown in Table 7.  732 
 733 
Table 7 734 
The Probabilities of Drawing Each Inference in Experiments 2 and 3 735 
 736 
  Negation 
Inf. Manip. Explicit (Not) Implicit (Con) 
MP (DA) MP (DA) 0.91 (Pr(¬q1|¬p1)) 0.00 (Pr(¬q1|p2)) 
 AC (MT) 1.00 (Pr(¬q1|¬p1)) 1.00 (Pr(¬q1|p2)) 
AC (MT) MP (DA) 1.00 (Pr(¬p1|¬q1)) 1.00 (Pr(¬p1|q3)) 
 AC (MT) 0.91 (Pr(¬p1|¬q1)) 0.00 (Pr(¬p1|q3)) 
DA (MP) MP (DA) 1.00 (Pr(q1|p1))  
 AC (MT) 0.80 (Pr(q1||p1))  
MT (AC) MP (DA) 0.80 (Pr(p1|q1))  
 AC (MT) 1.00 (Pr(p1|q1))  
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Note: Inf. = Inference; Manip. = Manipulation. The same probability distribution was used in 737 
Experiment 3, where it implements the inferences and manipulations shown in parentheses. 738 
 739 
Method  740 
Participants. 334 participants were recruited via MTurk after some were excluded 741 
because they may have been duplicates or participated in Experiment 1. All participants who 742 
completed the experiment received a small payment (between US$0.50 and US$1.00). 53.6% 743 
were female and the sample was aged between 18 and 83 with a median age of 36 years (mean = 744 
39.44, SD = 13.32). English was the first language of 96.4% of participants. 745 
Design and Materials. The experiment was a 6 (Inference and Negation: MP-Not, MP-746 
Con, AC-Not, AC-Con, DA, MT) by 2 (Manipulation: MP, AC) completely within subjects 747 
design. For each manipulation, participants first carried out a learning task, then the inference 748 
task, followed by the probability verification task as in the learning phase of Experiment 1. One 749 
set of materials was the same as in Experiment 1. The second set of materials involved vehicles 750 
and colours and the new target rule if it is not white, then it is not a van. All the relevant 751 
substitutions are shown in Table 6 (Note). The order in which participants conducted the task, 752 
MP- or AC-manipulation first (Path), and the order of materials, animals or vehicles first 753 
(Group), was determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment for each participant. The 754 
randomization worked well with roughly equal numbers of participants in the four possible Path 755 
by Group conditions (77, 85, 85, 87).  Possible artifacts produced by Path or Group were dealt 756 
with by treating the four possible Path by Group combinations as a four item random variable 757 
(PaGr) in mixed effects analyses. In this experiment, the learning phase used only 30 trials.  758 
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Procedure. The change from Experiment 1 was that in the two parts of the experiment, 759 
participants performed the learning, the inference, and the probability verification tasks in that 760 
order. In each part, this procedure was the same as in the learning phase of Experiment 1. 761 
 762 
Results and Discussion 763 
Attention test. With two learning tasks with thirty trials in each, each participant could 764 
make up to 120 errors. The mean error rate was less than 1% (.80, SD = 4.24). Most participants 765 
paid attention to the stimuli in the learning task and no participant was excluded from subsequent 766 
analyses.  767 
Probability verification task. Figure 3A and B shows the box-plots for each cell in 768 
Table 6 for both the MP- (3A) and the AC-manipulations (3B). The mean correlation between 769 
each participant’s estimates and the objective values was r(7) = .74 (SD = .32). We split 770 
participants into high and low correlation groups; high correlation (≥ median): mean r(7) = .96 771 
(SD = .04, N = 167), and low correlation (< median): mean r(7) = .52 (SD = .34, N = 167). The 772 
average correlations were higher for this cohort than in Experiment 1. If we used the same value 773 
for the median as Experiment 1 (.66), then the high group would contain 241 participants and the 774 
low group 93. The stronger probability manipulation led to more participants understanding the 775 
manipulation. Consequently, we analysed the data without splitting participants in to high and 776 
low correlation groups (except when we tested whether the calculated conditional probabilities 777 
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Figure 3 784 
Joint Probabilities and Calculated Conditional Probabilities from the Probability Verification 785 
Task in Experiment 2 786 
 787 
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Note. A. Box-plots for the verification judgements for all cells of Table 6:MP-Manipulation. B. 788 
Box-plots for the verification judgements for all cells of Table 6:AC-Manipulation. C. Mean 789 
calculated conditional probabilities for each inference based on the estimates shown in panels A 790 
and B, error bars = 95% HDI. In these panels, the large dark grey points indicate the objective 791 
probabilities for the MP-Manipulation and the large light grey points indicate the objective 792 
probabilities for the AC-Manipulation. 793 
 794 
We made the same correction for missing values because of division by zero when 795 
calculating conditional probabilities as in Experiment 1, which affected 29 participants (8.7%) 796 
and 2.5% of cell values in participants subjective JPDs. Again, this correction did not alter the 797 
correlations with the objective values. Figure 3C show the estimated marginal means of the 798 
calculated conditional probabilities for each inference split by manipulation (Manip). The means 799 
were estimated using a linear mixed model, Cond ~ InfNeg*Manip + (InfNeg*Manip|PaGr) with 800 
the Path and Group variable (PaGr) as a random effect to rule out materials and order artifacts. 801 
For the MP-manipulation, MP-Con (mean = .33 [.28, .37])  was lower than MP-Not 802 
(mean = .84 [.79, .88]), ?̅?  = 18.67 [16.80, 20.69], 1.0 ∉ ROPE), but zero was a credible value for 803 
the difference between AC-Con (mean = .90 [.87, .94])  and AC-Not (mean = .92 [.88, .92]), ?̅?  804 
= .63 [-1.12, 2.32], .70 ∉ ROPE). These results reversed for the AC-manipulation, zero was a 805 
credible value for the difference between MP-Con (mean = .91 [.86, .97])  and MP-Not (mean 806 
= .91 [.86, .97]), ?̅?  = .03 [-1.81, 1.90], .46 ∉ ROPE), but AC-Con (mean = .29 [.25, .33]) was 807 
lower than AC-Not (mean = .82 [.77, .87]), ?̅?  = 19.01 [17.28, 20.59], 1.0 ∉ ROPE). We did not 808 
further analyze the results for DA and MT, but note that the calculated conditional probabilities 809 
followed the cross over pattern predicted by the objective values. In summary, the calculated 810 
conditional probabilities based on the verification task produced the predicted MP-manipulation 811 
such that Pr(¬q1|¬p1) (MP-Not) > Pr(¬q1|p2) (MP-Con), and Pr(¬p1|¬q1) (AC-Not) ≈ Pr(¬p1|q3) 812 
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(AC-Con) and the predicted AC-manipulation such that Pr(¬q1|¬p1) (MP-Not) ≈ Pr(¬q1|p2) (MP-813 
Con), and Pr(¬p1|¬q1) (AC-Not) > Pr(¬p1|q3) (AC-Con). 814 
Inference Tasks. We first fitted a model to the inference task, using inference/negation 815 
and manipulation as categorical predictors with PaGr as a random effect (see, Figure 4A: Notes 816 
for the model). We show the estimated marginal means in Figure 4A. We then looked at the 817 
interaction between inference (Inf: MP and AC) and negation (Neg: Not, Con) for each 818 
manipulation.  As in Experiment 1, we compared two models, one which included the interaction 819 
(M1), and one with only the main effects (M2) (see, Table 8: Notes). Table 8 shows the results of 820 
the model comparison. The stacking weights and Δelpd converged on identifying M1, which 821 
includes the interaction, as the best model for both manipulations.  822 
We also assessed the critical simple effects. For the MP-manipulation, the probability of 823 
endorsing MP-Con (mean = .68 [.60, .76])  was lower than MP-Not (mean = .97 [.96, .99]), ?̅?  = 824 
7.63 [5.60, 9.57], 1.0 ∉ ROPE), but zero was a credible value for the difference between AC-Con 825 
(mean = .96 [.94, .98])  and AC-Not (mean = .94 [.91, .97]), ?̅?  = -1.23 [-3.24, 1.00], .81 ∉ 826 
ROPE). These results reversed for the AC-manipulation, zero was a credible value for the 827 
difference between MP-Con (mean = .94 [.92, .96])  and MP-Not (mean = .94 [.91, .96]), ?̅?  = 828 
-.43 [-2.58, 1.76], .58 ∉ ROPE), but AC-Con (mean = .55 [.50, .60]) was lower than AC-Not 829 
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Figure 4 840 
The Results of the Inference Tasks in Experiment 2 841 
 842 
Notes. A. The probability of endorsing each inference for the MP- and AC-manipulations 843 
(Endorse ~ InfNeg*Manip + (InfNeg*Manip|PaGr)), error bars = 95% HDI; B. The probability 844 
of endorsing an inference predicted by the calculated conditional probability for the high and 845 
low correlation groups; C. The relationship between calculated conditional probability and 846 
confidence for the high correlation group showing density plots for each variable; D. The 847 
probability of endorsing an inference predicted by the calculated conditional probability for the 848 
high correlation group with high and low confidence. 849 
 850 
In this experiment, we observed the predicted interactions confirming Hypothesis 1. An 851 
implicit negation effect only occurs when the contrast set member used to implicitly negate the 852 
antecedent or consequent indicates a low conditional probability of the conclusion. This analysis 853 
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directly addresses the possible criticism of Experiment 1 that we observed these effects only for 854 
the high correlation group. In analyzing these key predictions, in this experiment and the next, 855 
we did not split participants by high or low correlation groups. 856 
 857 
Table 8 858 
Model Comparison for Predicting Inference Endorsement Rates in Experiment 2 859 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
MP-Manipulation       
M1 772.8 44.7 8.3 0 0 0 .96 
M2 816.4 47.9 7.5 43.6 -21.8 7.1 .04 
AC-Manipulation       
M1 934.3 44.8 5.6 0 0 0 .95 
M2 971.1 47.0 4.9 36.8 -18.4 6.8 .05 
 860 
Notes. M1: Endorse ~ Inf*Neg + (Inf*Neg|PaGr), M2: Endorse ~ Inf + Neg + (Inf + Neg|PaGr). 861 
Estimated number of parameters (k), the difference (ΔLOOIC), the difference in expected log 862 
posterior predictive density (Δelpd) and its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian stacking 863 
weights (LOOIC-weight).  864 
 865 
Calculated conditional probabilities. We next tested whether the calculated conditional 866 
probabilities (Cond) were good predictors of responses in the inference task (Endorse). We 867 
compared the same models as in Experiment 1 but with PaGr as a random variable (see Table 9: 868 
Notes for the models compared) preserving the maximal random effect structure for each model 869 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). M5 is the model used to generate Figure 4A.  870 
 871 
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Table 9.  872 
Model Comparison for Predicting Endorsement Rates from Calculated Conditional Probabilities 873 
in Experiment 2 874 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
M3 2170.3 75.7 142.8 0 0 0 .78 
M5 2451.1 80.2 16.4 280.8 -140.4 24.7 .22 
M4 2751.2 81.9 137.2 580.9 -290.5 26.8 0 
 875 
Notes. M3: Endorse ~ Cond*Corr + (1|Participant) + (Cond*Corr|PaGr), M4: Endorse ~ Corr 876 
+ (1|Participant) + (Corr|PaGr), M5: Endorse ~ InfNeg*Manip + (InfNeg*Manip|PaGr). 877 
Estimated number of parameters (k), the difference in LOOICs (ΔLOOIC), the difference in 878 
expected log posterior predictive density (Δelpd) and its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian 879 
stacking weights (LOOIC-weight).  880 
 881 
Table 9 shows the results of the model comparison. The stacking weights and Δelpd 882 
converged on identifying M3 as the best model, confirming the results of Experiment 1 that most 883 
information relevant to drawing these inferences is in the predicted conditional probabilities. 884 
Figure 4B shows the relation between calculated conditional probability and endorsement rates 885 
for the high and low correlation groups for M3. The slope for the high correlation group was 886 
65.57 [34.88, 100.81] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE), that is, a .1 increase in calculated conditional 887 
probability increases the odds that an inference will be endorsed by 6.60.  For the low correlation 888 
group, the slope was 18.56 [8.88, 30.02] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE), that is, a .1 increase in calculated 889 
conditional probability increases the odds by 1.9. The intercept for the high correlation group 890 
was .92 [.59, 1.26], indicating that when the calculated conditional probability was zero, an 891 
inference was marginally more likely to be rejected than endorsed. For the low correlation group 892 
the intercept was 2.02 [1.10, 3.16]. The intercept was higher for the low correlation group than 893 
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for the high (?̅? = -2.67 [-6.01, .01], .97 ∉ ROPE), and the slope was steeper for the high 894 
correlation group than for the low (?̅? = 3.57 [1.27, 6.30], 1.0  ∉ ROPE).  895 
Replicating Experiment 1, calculated conditional probability was the best predictor of 896 
inference endorsement. This experiment also confirmed that correlation had a moderating effect. 897 
With the stronger probability manipulation, better understanding of the probability distribution 898 
(high correlation) led to greater sensitivity (a lower intercept and higher slope). The stronger 899 
probability manipulation also led to reduced uncertainty at the lower end of the scale, revealing 900 
that the intercepts also differed.  901 
Confidence. We next assessed the relationship between confidence and the predicted 902 
conditional probabilities. Figure 4C shows that they are linearly related, which we again assessed 903 
with separate intercepts for each participant and PaGr as a random effect. The population slope 904 
was 38.33 [33.44, 43.39] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE) indicating that a 0.1 increase in conditional 905 
probability lead to 3.83 point rise in confidence. Both distributions were skewed to the high end 906 
of the scale (see subplots in Figure 4C), and their median values were .89 (conditional 907 
probability) and 81 (confidence). Figure 4D shows that in Experiment 2, confidence did not 908 
moderate the effect of conditional probability on inference endorsement. Figure 4D is explained 909 
by the high correlation between confidence and calculated conditional probability (Figure 4C). 910 
Because of this correlation, most of the high calculated conditional probabilities were associated 911 
with high confidence. In contrast, the low calculated conditional probabilities were associated 912 
with low confidence but also, because of the median split (.89), with many high probability 913 
responses. Consequently, only low confidence responses had the spread to reveal the sensitivity 914 
of endorsement judgements to variation in calculated conditional probability. 915 
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 Summary. The stronger probability manipulation used in the learning phase of 916 
Experiment 2 strongly confirmed Hypothesis 1. There was an implicit negation effect for MP but 917 
not for AC for the MP manipulation, and an implicit negation effect for AC but not for MP for 918 
the AC manipulation. Not only were the simple effects significant, a model containing the 919 
interaction was a more accurate predictor of the data than a model with only the main effects. 920 
The calculated conditional probabilities for each inference derived from participants’ JPD 921 
estimates, were also the best predictor of the probability of endorsing an inference, confirming 922 
Hypothesis 3. Moreover, understanding the probability manipulation moderated the effect, with 923 
the high correlation group’s inference endorsements showing greater sensitivity to calculated 924 
conditional probability (lower intercept, higher slope). In contrast, confidence, although highly 925 
correlated with calculated conditional probability, confirming Hypothesis 4, did not moderate its 926 
effect on inference endorsement. This result is consistent with previous research that treated 927 
judgements of confidence as proxies for probabilities. These results are not consistent with other 928 
theories of the implicit negations effect, which all predict an implicit negation effect for both MP 929 
and AC regardless of the learned probability manipulation used in these experiments.  930 
 931 
Experiment 3: MT and DA Manipulation 932 
We have demonstrated that we can produce or eliminate the implicit negation effect by varying 933 
the learned probabilistic structure of the relevant contrast sets for MP and AC. In Experiment 3, 934 
we attempted to replicate and generalize these findings to the MT and DA inferences. In this 935 
experiment, we also used abstract material to show that we can produce the same probabilistic 936 
effects for the materials that first demonstrated the implicit negations effect. We used abstract 937 
content involving shapes and colours. The same probability manipulation as in Table 6 achieves 938 
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the desired result using the conditional if it is white, then it is a van. The AC-manipulation then 939 
generates an MT-manipulation and the MP-manipulation generates a DA-manipulation. We show 940 
the probability of drawing each inference in Table 7. In Experiment 3, p1 = red/white, p2 = 941 
yellow/blue, p3 = blue/red, q1 = circle/van, q2 = triangle/car, and q3 = square/motorbike.  942 
 943 
Method  944 
Participants. 168 participants were recruited via MTurk after some were excluded 945 
because they may have been duplicates or participated in Experiments 1 or 2. All participants 946 
who completed the experiment received a small payment (between US$0.50 and US$1.00). 947 
56.0% were female and the sample was aged between 19 and 75 with a median age of 34 years 948 
(mean = 38.05, SD = 13.75). English was the first language of 96.4% of participants. 949 
Design and Materials. The experiment was a 6 (Inference and Negation: MT-Not, MT-950 
Con, DA-Not, DA-Con, AC, MP) by 2 (Manipulation: MT, DA) completely within subjects 951 
design. One set of materials was the same as in Experiment 2 but using the new target 952 
conditional if it is white, then it is a van. The second set of materials involved coloured shapes 953 
and the target conditional if it is red, then it is a circle. For the abstract materials, participants 954 
were provided with a back story involving a quality control manager checking the output of a 955 
machine printing cards of different shapes and colours (as in Oaksford et al. 2000: Experiment 956 
1). Other than these changes, the design of Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2. The 957 
randomization worked well with roughly equal numbers of participants in the four possible Path 958 
by Group conditions (35, 37, 45, 51).  959 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. 960 
 961 
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Figure 5 962 
Joint Probabilities and Calculated Conditional Probabilities from the Probability Verification 963 
Task in Experiment 3 964 
 965 
 966 
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Note. A. Box-plots for the verification judgements for all cells of Table 6:MT-Manipulation. B. 967 
Box-plots for the verification judgements for all cells of Table 6:DA-Manipulation. C. Mean 968 
calculated conditional probabilities for each inference based on the estimates shown in panels A 969 
and B, error bars = 95% HDI. In these panels, the large dark grey points indicate the objective 970 
probabilities for the MT-Manipulation and the large light grey points indicate the objective 971 
probabilities for the DA-Manipulation. 972 
 973 
Results and Discussion 974 
Attention test. The mean error rate (out of 120) was less than 1.0 % (1.10, SD = 4.24). 975 
Most participants paid attention to the stimuli in the learning task and so we did not exclude any 976 
participants from the subsequent analyses.  977 
Probability verification task. Figure 5A and B shows the box-plots for each cell in 978 
Table 5 for both the MT- (5A) and the DA-manipulations (5B). The mean correlation between 979 
each participant’s estimates and the objective values was r(7) = .75 (SD = .32). We split 980 
participants into high and low correlation groups; high correlation (≥ median): mean r(7) = .95 981 
(SD = .04, N = 87), and low correlation (< median): mean r(7) = .47 (SD = .34, N = 81). As for 982 
Experiment 2, we analysed the data without splitting participants in to high and low correlation 983 
groups, except when we tested whether the calculated conditional probabilities were good 984 
predictors of responses in the inference task. 985 
We made the same correction for missing values because of division by zero when 986 
calculating conditional probabilities as in Experiments 1 and 2, which affected 19 participants 987 
(11.3%) and 2.4% of cell values in participants subjective JPDs. Again, this correction did not 988 
alter the correlations with the objective values. Figure 5C shows the estimated marginal means of 989 
the calculated conditional probabilities for each inference split by manipulation (Manip). We 990 
estimated these means using the same linear mixed model as in Experiment 2. 991 
 992 
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Figure 6 993 
The Results of the Inference Tasks in Experiment 3 994 
 995 
Notes. A. The probability of endorsing each inference for the MT- and DA-manipulations 996 
(Endorse ~ InfNeg*Manip + (InfNeg*Manip|PaGr)), error bars = 95% HDI; B. The probability 997 
of endorsing an inference predicted by the calculated conditional probability for the high and 998 
low correlation groups; C. The relationship between calculated conditional probability and 999 
confidence for the high correlation group showing density plots for each variable; D. The 1000 
probability of endorsing an inference predicted by the calculated conditional probability for the 1001 
high correlation group with high and low confidence. 1002 
 1003 
For the MT-manipulation, MT-Con (mean = .35 [.25, .46])  was lower than MT-Not 1004 
(mean = .81 [.73, .89]), ?̅?  = 9.62 [7.12, 11.99], 1.0 ∉ ROPE), but zero was a credible value for 1005 
the difference between DA-Con (mean = .92 [.84, 1.00])  and DA-Not (mean = .91 [.83, .98]), ?̅?  1006 
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= -.34 [-2.62, 1.92], .59 ∉ ROPE). These results reversed for the DA-manipulation, zero was a 1007 
credible value for the difference between MT-Con (mean = .93 [.86, .99])  and MT-Not (mean 1008 
= .91 [.85, .97]), ?̅?  = -.45 [-2.84, 1.80], .62 ∉ ROPE), but DA-Con (mean = .26 [.20, .32]) was 1009 
lower than DA-Not (mean = .84 [.79, .91]), ?̅?  = 19.47 [17.20, 22.14], 1.0 ∉ ROPE). We did not 1010 
further analyze the results for AC and MP, but note that the calculated conditional probabilities 1011 
followed the cross over pattern predicted by the objective values. In summary, the calculated 1012 
conditional probabilities based on the verification task produced the predicted MT-manipulation 1013 
such that Pr(¬q1|¬p1) (MT-Not) > Pr(¬q1|p2) (MT-Con), and Pr(¬p1|¬q1) (DA-Not) ≈ Pr(¬p1|q3) 1014 
(DA-Con) and the predicted DA-manipulation such that Pr(¬q1|¬p1) (MT-Not) ≈ Pr(¬q1|p2) (MT-1015 
Con), and Pr(¬p1|¬q1) (DA-Not) > Pr(¬p1|q3) (DA-Con). 1016 
Inference Tasks. We observed no differences for the abstract materials and so we first 1017 
fitted the same model to the inference task as in Experiment 2 (see, Figure 6A: Notes for the 1018 
model) with the combined Path and Group variable as a random factor. We show the estimated 1019 
marginal means in Figure 6A. We then looked at the interaction between inference (Inf: MT and 1020 
DA) and negation (Neg: Not, Con) for each manipulation.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, we 1021 
compared s model which included the interaction (M1) with one with only the main effects (M2) 1022 
(see, Table 10: Notes), and we show the results in Table 10. The stacking weights and Δelpd 1023 
converged on identifying M1, which includes the interaction, as the best model for both 1024 
manipulations. 1025 
We also assessed the critical simple effects. For the MT-manipulation, MT-Con (mean 1026 
= .62 [.51, .71])  was lower than MT-Not (mean = .95 [.91, .98]), ?̅?  = 8.96 [6.34, 11.57], 1.0 ∉ 1027 
ROPE), but zero was a credible value for the difference between DA-Con (mean = .96 [.92, .99])  1028 
and DA-Not (mean = .92 [.88, .97]), ?̅?  = -1.73 [-4.61, .87], .88 ∉ ROPE). These results reversed 1029 
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for the DA-manipulation, zero was a credible value for the difference between MT-Con (mean 1030 
= .95 [.91, .98])  and MT-Not (mean = .96 [.93, .99]), ?̅?  = .71 [-2.05, 3.51], .66 ∉ ROPE), but 1031 
DA-Con (mean = .55 [.50, .60]) was lower than DA-Not (mean = .93 [.91, .96]), ?̅?  = 11.10 1032 
[8.34, 13.70], 1.0 ∉ ROPE). 1033 
 1034 
Table 10 1035 
Model Comparison for Predicting Inference Endorsement Rates in Experiment 3 1036 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
MT-Manipulation       
M1 453.0 32.4 5.7 0 0 0 .93 
M2 478.1 34.2 4.8 25.1 -12.6 5.6 .07 
DA-Manipulation       
M1 444.3 32.2 7.1 0 0 0 .86 
M2 454.1 33.2 5.9 9.8 -4.9 3.9 .14 
 1037 
Notes. M1: Endorse ~ Inf*Neg + (Inf*Neg|PaGr), M2: Endorse ~ Inf + Neg + (Inf + Neg|PaGr). 1038 
Estimated number of parameters (k), the difference (ΔLOOIC), the difference in expected log 1039 
posterior predictive density (Δelpd) and its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian stacking 1040 
weights (LOOIC-weight).  1041 
 1042 
Replicating Experiment 2, but now for MT and DA, we observed the predicted 1043 
interactions confirming Hypothesis 1. An implicit negation effect only occurs when the contrast 1044 
set member used to implicitly negate the antecedent or consequent indicates a low conditional 1045 
probability of the conclusion. 1046 
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Calculated conditional probabilities. We next tested whether the calculated conditional 1047 
probabilities (Cond) were good predictors of responses in the inference task (Endorse). We 1048 
compared the same models as in Experiment 2 (see Table 11: Notes for the models compared). 1049 
M5 is the model used to generate Figure 6A. Table 11 shows the results of the model 1050 
comparison. The stacking weights and Δelpd converged on identifying M3 as the best model, 1051 
confirming the results of Experiments 1 and 2 that most information relevant to drawing these 1052 
inferences is in the predicted conditional probabilities. Figure 6B shows the relation between 1053 
calculated conditional probability and endorsement rates for the high and low correlation groups 1054 
for M3. The slope for the high correlation group was 365.68 [101.45, 716.17] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ 1055 
ROPE), that is, a .1 increase in calculated conditional probability increases the odds that an 1056 
inference will be endorsed by 36.5.  For the low correlation group, the slope was 8.09 [2.25, 1057 
15.30] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE), that is, a .1 increase in calculated conditional probability increases 1058 
the odds by .81. The intercept for the high correlation group was .64 [.33, 1.00], indicating that 1059 
when the calculated conditional probability was zero, an inference was marginally more likely to 1060 
be rejected than endorsed. For the low correlation group the intercept was 7.63 [2.63, 14.48]. The 1061 
intercept was higher for the low correlation group than for the high (?̅? = -2.92 [-5.86, -.76], 1.0 ∉ 1062 
ROPE), and the slope was steeper for the high correlation group than for the low (?̅? = 2.64 [.67, 1063 
5.21], 1.0  ∉ ROPE).  1064 
Replicating Experiments 1 and 2, calculated conditional probability was the best 1065 
predictor of inference endorsement. This experiment also confirmed that correlation had a 1066 
moderating effect. With the stronger probability manipulation, better understanding of the 1067 
probability distribution (high correlation) leads to greater sensitivity (lower intercept, steeper 1068 
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slope). Replicating Experiment 2, the stronger probability manipulation led to reduced 1069 
uncertainty at the lower end of the scale, revealing that the intercepts also differed.  1070 
 1071 
Table 11.  1072 
Model Comparison for Predicting Endorsement Rates from Calculated Conditional Probabilities 1073 
in Experiment 3 1074 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
M3 930.2 50.7 85.9 0 0 0 .85 
M5 1173.7 57.5 16.1 243.5 -121.7 21.0 .15 
M4 1324.1 58.1 78.8 393.9 -197.0 21.5 0 
 1075 
Notes. M3: Endorse ~ Cond*Corr + (1|Participant) + (Cond*Corr|PaGr), M4: Endorse ~ Corr 1076 
+ (1|Participant) + (Corr|PaGr), M5: Endorse ~ InfNeg*Manip + (InfNeg*Manip|PaGr). 1077 
Estimated number of parameters (k), the difference in LOOICs (ΔLOOIC), the difference in 1078 
expected log posterior predictive density (Δelpd) and its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian 1079 
stacking weights (LOOIC-weight).  1080 
 1081 
Confidence. We next assessed the relationship between confidence and the predicted 1082 
conditional probabilities. Figure 6C shows that they are linearly related, which we again assessed 1083 
with separate intercepts for each participant and PaGr as a random effect. The population slope 1084 
was 42.88 [30.80, 55.51] (b > 0, 1.0 ∉ ROPE), indicating that a 0.1 increase in conditional 1085 
probability led to a 4.28 point rise in confidence. Both distributions were skewed to the high end 1086 
of the scale (see subplots in Figure 6C), and their median values were .88 (conditional 1087 
probability) and 83 (confidence). Figure 6D shows that, replicating Experiment 2, confidence did 1088 
not moderate the effect of conditional probability on inference endorsement. As for Experiment 1089 
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2, Figure 6D is explained by the high correlation between confidence and calculated conditional 1090 
probability (Figure C6).  1091 
 Summary. Experiment 3 confirmed Hypothesis 1 for MT and DA. There was an implicit 1092 
negation effect for MT but not for DA for the MT manipulation, and an implicit negation effect 1093 
for DA but not for MT for the DA manipulation. Not only were the simple effects significant, a 1094 
model containing the interaction was a more accurate predictor of the data than a model with 1095 
only the main effects. The calculated conditional probabilities for each inference derived from 1096 
participants’ JPD estimates, were also the best predictor of the probability of endorsing an 1097 
inference, confirming Hypothesis 3. Moreover, understanding the probability manipulation 1098 
moderated the effect, with the high correlation group’s inference endorsements showing greater 1099 
sensitivity to calculated conditional probability (lower intercept, higher slope). In contrast, 1100 
confidence, although highly correlated with calculated conditional probability, confirming 1101 
Hypothesis 4, did not moderate its effect on inference endorsement. This result is consistent with 1102 
previous research that treated judgements of confidence as proxies for probabilities. These results 1103 
are not consistent with other theories, which all predict an implicit negation effect for both MT 1104 
and DA regardless of the probability manipulation used in these experiments.  1105 
 1106 
General Discussion 1107 
Experiments 1 to 3 provided focused experimental tests of the new paradigm probabilistic 1108 
explanation of the implicit negation effect in conditional inference. We used short discrete 1109 
learning tasks to impart probabilistic information about contextually limited sets of objects and 1110 
their properties to manipulate whether an implicitly negated premise would lead to a high or low 1111 
conditional probability of the conclusion. In Experiment 1, for the high correlation group we 1112 
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observed an implicit negation effect for MP but not for AC, consistent with the probability 1113 
manipulation. The effects were large in terms of effect size but not of the same apparent 1114 
magnitude as previously observed. In Experiment 2, we strengthened the probability 1115 
manipulation and added an AC manipulation to test whether we could elicit and suppress the 1116 
effect for both inferences. This manipulation produced a much larger effect on calculated 1117 
conditional probabilities and a correspondingly larger implicit negation effect. We also observed 1118 
the key interaction showing an implicit negation effect only when predicted by the probability 1119 
manipulation. Experiment 3 replicated these findings for MT and DA inferences. Across all three 1120 
experiments, the calculated conditional probability was the best predictor of the odds of 1121 
endorsing an inference and this effect was moderated by the strength of the correlation between 1122 
people’s judgements of the joint probabilities (Tables 2 and 6) and the objective values. 1123 
Participants who had better learned the probability distribution (high correlation group) showed 1124 
greater sensitivity (lower intercept, higher slope) to the calculated conditional probability when 1125 
endorsing inferences. Calculated conditional probability predicted confidence in whether 1126 
participants endorsed an inference or not, but confidence did not moderate its effect on inference 1127 
endorsement. This result is consistent with previous research that used confidence judgements as 1128 
proxies for probabilities. These results raise a number of issues that we now address. We begin 1129 
by looking at Bayesian New Paradigm approaches that can implement the predictions that we 1130 
have just tested.  1131 
 1132 
New Paradigm Probabilistic Approaches 1133 
In deriving our predictions we have assumed that the probability of the conclusion of an 1134 
inference is the conditional probability of the conclusion given the categorical premise. 1135 
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However, as we indicated in the introduction, this rubric does not provide an account of what 1136 
people are doing when they learn the categorical premise that provides a theory of inference at 1137 
either the computational or algorithm level. Fortunately, as we also observed, both approaches 1138 
we now consider lead to exactly the same predictions that our experiments have just tested.  1139 
 Belief revision. One approach is to treat inference as belief revision by conditionalization 1140 
(Eva & Hartmann, 2018; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2010b, 2013). This approach provides a 1141 
computational level theory that justifies our predictions. As we have argued, learning from 1142 
experience or a reliable informant leads people to revise their degrees of belief from a 1143 
distribution like Pr0 to new a distribution like Pr1 in Table 1. Conditionalization similarly treats 1144 
learning the categorical premise as belief revision to a new distribution Pr2. By Jeffrey 1145 
conditionalization this is achieved via the law of total probability. For example, (2) shows how to 1146 
calculate the new probability of the conclusion for the MP inference, where you learn a new 1147 
probability of p, Pr2(p), that is you come to believe that Johnny travelled to Manchester more 1148 
strongly (> .4).  1149 
   Pr2(q) = Pr1(q|p)Pr2(p) + Pr1(q|¬p)Pr2(¬p)  (2) 1150 
If, however, learning p leads to Pr2(p) = 1 (perhaps you think your informant is completely 1151 
reliable, i.e., Johnny is definitely travelling to Manchester), then (2) reduces to Bayesian 1152 
conditionalization, where Pr2(¬p) = 0. Consequently, MP on the conditional if p then q in Pr1 in 1153 
Table 1 leads to: 1154 
   Pr2(q) = Pr1(q|p)Pr2(p) = Pr1(q|p) = .75  (3) 1155 
That is, the new probability of the conclusion is the old conditional probability of the conclusion 1156 
given the categorical premise. Consequently, treating inference as Bayesian conditionalization 1157 
justifies all our predictions. 1158 
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 However, it could be argued that there is a problem with this approach. Take MT on Pr1 1159 
in Table 1, which leads to (4). 1160 
  Pr2(¬p) = Pr1(¬p|¬q)Pr2(¬q) = Pr1(¬p|¬q) = .833  (4) 1161 
In the new distribution Pr2, Pr2(q) = 0, and hence Pr2(q|p) = 0. So in Pr2, we should no longer 1162 
find the conditional premise acceptable. That the probability of the conditional premise is not 1163 
invariant across the belief update means that it is difficult to regard the revision to Pr2 as 1164 
capturing what it means to draw these inferences. This set of four logical inferences concern 1165 
what follows from the premises assumed true or highly probable. Indeed, given (4), this 1166 
approach seems to imply that we should now believe that Johnny never travels anywhere by 1167 
train. 1168 
However, this argument turns on an equivocation between our enduring beliefs versus 1169 
how they allow us to draw inferences from the momentary and changing flow of information we 1170 
experience. Learning about the conditional premise involves adjusting your enduring beliefs 1171 
about Johnny’s travelling habits (the transition from Pr0 to Pr1). However, learning the 1172 
categorical premise in inference does not have this effect. In this example, Pr1 represents your 1173 
enduring beliefs about Johnny’s travelling habits, however acquired. In contrast, Pr2 concerns 1174 
how you revise your beliefs about a specific journey based on this knowledge, in which you 1175 
learn he travelled to Manchester, or he did not take the train, and so on. So what remains 1176 
invariant in the revision from Pr1 to Pr2 is the target conditional probability, Pr(¬q|¬p) for 1177 
DA…etc. However, this revision, required for inference, does not mean that people abandon 1178 
their enduring beliefs about Johnny’s travelling habits in Pr1. Although nothing intrinsic to 1179 
probability theory enforces this distinction, it is enforced in algorithms for implementing 1180 
probabilistic inference, for example, Bayes nets. 1181 
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Bayes nets. A simple Bayes net implementing the JPD Pr1 in Table 1, consists of two 1182 
nodes, p and q, corresponding to Bayesian random variables each with two possible states, 1 1183 
(True) and 0 (False), and a directional link from p to q. Inference over the net consists of variable 1184 
instantiation, that is, setting p or q to one of their states, say, p = 1, and belief propagation across 1185 
the link to the q node or backwards to the p node. The probability that the q node is in either of 1186 
its two states is determined by its conditional probability table (CPT), which includes Pr(q = 1|p 1187 
= 1) = .75 (and so Pr(q = 0|p = 1) = .25) and Pr(q = 1|p = 0) = .167 (and so Pr(q = 0|p = 0) 1188 
= .833). Together with the marginal for p, Pr(p = 1) = .4, the parameters Pr(q = 1|p = 1) = .75, 1189 
and Pr(q = 1|p = 0) = .167 implements the JPD Pr1 in Table 1 in the network. These parameters 1190 
encode our enduring beliefs about Johnny’s travelling habits and remain invariant across 1191 
different instantiations of its variables to their states.  1192 
In this framework, the evidence provided by the categorical premise need not persuade us 1193 
that, for example, the probability that Johnny travels to Manchester is 1, Pr(p) = 1, and so we 1194 
should now believe he travels nowhere else. Rather it provides hard evidence to instantiate p to 1195 
1, and to read off the probability that q = 1, in an MP inference. Hard evidence always 1196 
instantiates a variable to just one of its states. This process is like performing a Ramsey test, 1197 
supposing the categorical premise by instantiating the relevant state of a random variable, 1198 
adjusting (i.e., forward and backward belief propagation), and then reading off the probability of 1199 
the conclusion, which for MP will be the conditional probability Pr(q = 1|p = 1). This process is 1200 
the same for the remaining inferences by forward (MP, DA) or backward belief propagation (MT, 1201 
AC). Like Bayesian conditionalization, it also justifies all our predictions and can be extended to 1202 
provide an algorithmic level account of inference with contrast sets. 1203 
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Bayes nets, negative evidence, and contrast sets. We can implement the JPD in Table 2 1204 
in a Bayesian network with ternary, rather than binary states, with the CPT in Table 12. This CPT 1205 
contains two random variables p (travel destinations) and q (modes of transport) with states {p1, 1206 
p2, p3} and {q1, q2, q3} respectively. The assertion Johnny did not travel to Manchester (p = ¬p1), 1207 
does not provide hard evidence concerning to which other destination, Paris or Dublin, he did 1208 
travel. Rather, it provides negative evidence that p can only be instantiated to states p2 or p3 but 1209 
not to p1 (Bilmes, 2004; Mrad, Delcroix, Piechowiak, Leicester, Mohamed, 2015; Pearl, 1988).  1210 
 1211 
Table 12 1212 
Conditional probability table for a Bayes Net with ternary states implementing the JPD in Table 1213 
2 showing the conditional probabilities Pr(qi|pi) and marginals for pi. 1214 
 1215 
 p =  p1 (.40) p =  p2 (.16) p =  p3(.44) 
q =  q1 0.750 0.625 0 
q =  q2 0.100 0.250 0.500 
q =  q3 0.150 0.125 0.500 
 1216 
Note: p1 = Manchester, p2 = Paris, p3 = Dublin, q1 = train, q2 = ferry, q3 = plane. 1217 
 1218 
Following Pearl (1988), we can implement updating on negative evidence using virtual 1219 
nodes for each state of p and q. These virtual nodes are the children of the ternary nodes p and q 1220 
in a Bayes net (see Figure 7) with Table 12 as the CPT for the q node (see also, Bilmes, 2004; 1221 
Mrad et al., 2015). Figure 7 also shows the CPTs for the virtual nodes Vxy. For the state p1 of 1222 
node p Pr(Vp1 = 0|p = p1) = 0. Consequently, if Vp1 = 0, then the travel destination (p) cannot be 1223 
Manchester (p1), p ≠ p1. So the categorical premise Johnny did not travel to Manchester provides 1224 
evidence that Vp1 = 0, and consequently that state p1 is no longer a possible state of p but that 1225 
both p2 and p3 are possible because Pr(Vp1 = 0|p = p2) = 1 and Pr(Vp1 = 0|p = p3) = 1. This Bayes 1226 
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net implements exactly the calculations we carried out over the JPD in Table 2 to derive our 1227 
predictions.10 Once this Bayes net is learned, inference is easy, and carried out by variable 1228 
instantiation and belief propagation, without the need for any conscious mental calculation. For 1229 
example, MP on (1), with the categorical premise Johnny did not travel to Manchester, involves 1230 
instantiating Vp1 = 0, updating the network, and reading off the probability that Vq1 = 0.
11  1231 
 1232 
Figure 7 1233 
Bayes Net implementing the CPT in Table 12 with virtual nodes implementing updating on 1234 




It could be argued that this Bayes net would only work well for small contrast sets. 1239 
Nonetheless, given that on any particular occasion of using a negation, context and other 1240 
                                                 
 
10 It could be argued that this process does not capture the logical inferences that we purport to study. 
Nonetheless, our experiments, and many others, present participants with versions of the standard logical inference 
patterns (MP, MT, AC, & DA). Whether or not belief propagation in Bayes nets adequately characterizes these 
inference patterns from a logical point of view, this process may nonetheless account for how people respond to 
these inference patterns when presented in experimental tasks and in the real world. Moreover, this may be because 
people are not particularly interested in what logically follows from some premises, what they want to know is how 
to update, revise, or otherwise change their beliefs so that they can act appropriately (Harman 1986; Oaksford & 
Chater, 2020a). 
11 In contrast, calculating Pr(¬q1|¬p1) over the JPD in Table 2 involves the following calculation: (Pr(p2, q2) 
+ Pr(p2, q3) + Pr(p3, q2) + Pr(p3, q3))/(Pr(p2, q1) + Pr(p2, q2) + Pr(p2, q3) + Pr(p3, q1) + Pr(p3, q2) + Pr(p3, q3)), which 
we used to derive our predictions. 
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pragmatic factors will strongly constrain the contrast set, this may be all that is needed (Oaksford 1241 
& Stenning, 1992). Moreover, as we have argued (see introduction to Experiment 2), in inference 1242 
people only build very limited small-scale generative models related to their immediate deictic or 1243 
linguistic context (Oakford & Chater, 2020a).12 These models are constructed on the fly (Chater, 1244 
2018) based on linguistic information and prior knowledge, in particular, from immediate past 1245 
experience, as in decision by sampling models (Stewart, et al., 2006). 1246 
The Bayes net in Figure 7 also captures many of our intuitions about contrast sets; in 1247 
particular, that their internal probabilistic structure will render some contrast set members more 1248 
likely than others. Take the following examples with the word in bold stressed in speech. 1249 
 Johnny did not travel to Manchester by train  (5) 1250 
Johnny did not travel to Paris by train   (5′) 1251 
The cat was not black     (5′′) 1252 
The cat was not black     (5′′′) 1253 
In (5) Johnny travelled somewhere else by train, not Manchester, in (5′′) Johnny travelled to 1254 
Paris by some other mode of transport, not train,  in (5′′) some other animal was black, not the 1255 
cat, and in (5′′′) the cat was some other colour, not black. Identifying the most likely contrast set 1256 
member for destination (5) involves instantiating p to ¬p1, on negative evidence, and q to q1. The 1257 
model then identifies Paris as the most likely contrast set member, because Pr(p = p2|Vp1 = 0, q = 1258 
q1) = 1 and Pr(p = p3|Vp1 = 0, q = q1) = 0. In (5′), the model identifies ferry as the most likely 1259 
contrast set member because Pr(q = q2|p = p2 Vq1 = 0) = .67 but Pr(q = q3|p = p2, Vq1 = 0) = .33. 1260 
Directly analogous effects will occur for (5′′) and (5′′′). These effects suggest that the Bayes net 1261 
                                                 
 
12 In this, we agree with mental models theory, although, we disagree on the nature of the small scale 
models people construct. 
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in Figure 7 may provide a more general theory of contrary negation and the effects of negative 1262 
focus in speech.  1263 
Causal Bayes nets. We have previously argued that people mentally represent 1264 
conditionals in causal Bayes nets (Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011; Ali, Schlottman, Shaw, Chater, 1265 
& Oaksford, 2010; Chater & Oaksford, 2006; Oaksford & Chater, 2010b, 2013, 2016, 2017). 1266 
However, to capture the implicit negation effect, we have not needed to assume any general 1267 
probabilistic independencies and so the Bayes net in Figure 7 has been sufficient. 13 However, 1268 
our account of how people compute contrast sets borrows partly from causal approaches to 1269 
category structure, in which intrinsic properties of a category cause the various features it 1270 
possesses (Rehder, 2003a, 2003b, 2017). Moreover, we have suggested that people think about 1271 
habits like causes, so, for Johnny, travelling to Manchester causes him to travel by train 1272 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2010, 2020b). We may acquire habits and dispositions from our parents, 1273 
peers, culture or by intention, but they are rapidly sedimented into the unconscious causes of our 1274 
actions. All the elements of the ad hoc superordinate category (Barsalou, 1983)—places to which 1275 
Johnny travels (p)—are causally related to travel destinations considered as features (q). It is a 1276 
desiderata, therefore, to investigate models integrating CBNs with negative evidence in 1277 
modelling conditional reasoning.   1278 
 A minor complication is that if we model contrast sets causally then the direction of 1279 
causality matters. Some of our materials were diagnostic conditionals, for example, in the 1280 
vehicles materials the conditional was if it is not white, then it is not a van. We think of objects 1281 
like vans as having features like colour and that it is some intrinsic property of the object that 1282 
                                                 
 
13 See Supplementary Online Materials: Section for an example CBN with parameters corresponding to the 
JPD in Pr1 in Table 1.  
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causes its colour.14 A CBN representation would require representing the consequent (q) as the 1283 
cause and the antecedent (p) as the effect. This complication is minor, because we already know 1284 
from their patterns of discounting and augmentation inferences that people recode diagnostic 1285 
conditionals in this way (Ali et al., 2011).  1286 
 A possible argument against the appeal to CBNs, concern recent demonstrations that 1287 
people violate the independence assumptions of these models (Rehder, 2014; Rottman & Hastie, 1288 
2016). However, there are models that can account for these violations (Rehder, 2018). 1289 
Moreover, the empirically most adequate model may arise from limited sampling from initially 1290 
preferred states of the underlying generative causal model (Davis & Rehder, 2017; Rehder, 1291 
2018). It remains to be seen whether similar violations occur when identifying contrast set 1292 
members, but the theoretical machinery may be in place to explain them. Processing accounts 1293 
based on limited sampling from an underlying generative model have also been used to explain 1294 
away a variety of other biases (Dasgupta, et al., 2017; Hattori, 2016; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; 1295 
Stewart, et al., 2006) 1296 
 1297 
Alternative Theories 1298 
There are three alternative theories of the implicit negations effect, the matching heuristic 1299 
(Evans, 1998; Thompson, Evans & Campbell, 2013), mental models theory (MMT; Johnson-1300 
Laird & Byrne, 2002; Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012), and the cardinality of the 1301 
                                                 
 
14 White is the cheapest “vanilla” option that manufacturers provide for vans, and white vans are therefore 
very common. In the UK, there is even a phenomenon of the “white van driver,” usually fast and discourteous. 
Consequently, it is a reasonable claim to make that if the vehicle was not white it probably was not a van. Of course, 
although these are reasons for why many vans are white, philosophically reasons are not causes. However, we have 
argued that people think about most dependencies as if they were causal (Oaksford & Chater, 2010, 2020b). 
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contrast set hypothesis (Schroyens & Schaeken, 2000; Schroyens, Verschueren, Schaeken, & 1302 
d’Ydewalle, 2000). MMT implements the double hurdle theory proposed by proponents of the 1303 
heuristic approach. Consequently, these theories stand, and fall, together. The first hurdle is to 1304 
see an implicit negation as relevant, that is, as an instance of the negated antecedent or 1305 
consequent of a conditional.15 In MMT, negations are represented using explicit contradictory 1306 
negation tags. The first hurdle is that, unless people can recode the implicitly negated categorical 1307 
premise using such a tag, they do not realize that a constituent in a mental model has been denied 1308 
or affirmed. The second hurdle requires a double negation inference, so MT on (1), requires the 1309 
inference from it is not the case that he did not travel to Manchester (¬¬p) to he travelled to 1310 
Manchester (¬¬p → p). This inference is only required for DA and MT. Both theories locate the 1311 
problem with implicit negations solely as a difficulty in seeing them as denying or affirming a 1312 
negated antecedent or consequent. Consequently, they do not predict any of the probabilistic 1313 
effects we observed.  1314 
Binary sets, where there are, say, just two letters {A, K} and the contrast set is a singleton, 1315 
remove the implicit negation effects in comparison to larger sets {A, K, W} where the contrast set 1316 
has more than one member (Schroyens, Schaeken, Verschueren, & d’Ydewalle, 2000). The 1317 
cardinality of the contrast set hypothesis (CCS) is that a contrast set with more than one member 1318 
causes the implicit negation effect. According to this hypothesis with larger contrast sets, 1319 
participants find it difficult to regard the specific instance, K, as representing the superordinate 1320 
                                                 
 
15 The matching heuristic describes peoples’ apparent inability to deal with mis-matching cases. So, for a 
conditional, if A then not 2, they find it difficult to recognise K as denying the antecedent or 7 as affirming the 
consequent. In Wason’s selection task (Evans & Lynch, 1973), this inability leads participants to match, that is, they 
select instances named in the conditional, A and 2, as the cards they need to turn over to verify or falsify it 
(assuming it describes what is on the faces of double sided cards, of which they can only see one side). Although 
logically correct for this conditional, they also select A and 2 for if A then 2. 
EXPLAINING THE IMPLICIT NEGATIONS EFFECT IN CONDITIONAL INFERENCE 67 
category, letters that are not A. Schroyens et al. (2000) observed implicit negation effects for 1321 
contrasts sets with two or more members (overall sets sizes of three or more) but not for 1322 
singleton sets. Although CCS exploits the notion of a contrast set, it does not appeal to their role 1323 
in computing probabilities. All the contrast sets in our experiments had two members. 1324 
Consequently, our probabilistic manipulations removed the implicit negation effect even for 1325 
contrast sets whose cardinalities were greater than one (we refer to this situation as “contrast 1326 
set(s) > 1”), which is not consistent with the CCS hypothesis. We now briefly consider some 1327 
recent further evidence supportive of the matching heuristic or mental models.  1328 
 In the Wason selection task, the matching heuristic response (see, Footnote 15) seems 1329 
meta-cognitively fluent (Thompson, et al., 2013).  That is, participants’ “answers consistent with 1330 
a matching heuristic (i.e., selecting cards named in the rule) were made more quickly than other 1331 
answers, were given higher FOR [feeling of rightness] ratings, and received less subsequent 1332 
analysis as measured by rethinking time and the probability of changing answers” (Thompson, et 1333 
al., 2013, p. 431). From a probabilistic perspective, this is not surprising as the probabilistic 1334 
contrast set account makes the same predictions in this evidence acquisition task (Oaksford & 1335 
Chater, 2003; 2007; Oaksford, Chater, Grainger & Larkin, 1997). It, therefore, provides a 1336 
rational analysis of why in data acquisition a matching heuristic is rational. The question of 1337 
whether this rational analysis is implemented by a heuristic or a probabilistic algorithm depends 1338 
on whether behaviour can be changed by probabilistic manipulations and the results show that 1339 
this is possible (e.g., Oaksford et al., 1997). We know of no similar demonstration of fluency for 1340 
the matching responses in conditional inference. However, we would speculate that if people 1341 
deploy such a heuristic in the conditional inference task, it is probably learned rather than hard-1342 
wired and so can be overridden by subsequent learning, as our experiments demonstrated.  1343 
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The motivation for an explicit negation tag in MMT derives from the psycholinguistic 1344 
literature where it is hypothesized that people construct two representations of a negated 1345 
assertion like “the door is not open” (Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007; Khemlani et al., 2012, 1346 
Orenes, Beltran, & Santamaria, 2014).  In the first representation, the door is open and in the 1347 
second, it is closed. This strategy works for binary opposites or antonyms, like open and closed, 1348 
but what about “the dot is not blue” presented in an array of four coloured dots (Orenes et al. 1349 
2014)? Here the second representation would have to include all the other three dots. The 1350 
negations tag therefore acts as a short hand for the opposites when the overall set size is greater 1351 
than two. If people represent opposites (contrast sets) for the contrast set > 1 case using a 1352 
negations tag, then the content of both representations still includes the affirmative statement 1353 
(e.g., blue dot). Using a visual world array like this, Orenes et al. (2014) used an innovative eye 1354 
tracking experiment to show that visual attention switches to the alternative when sets are binary 1355 
(singleton contrast set) but remains on the affirmative item when the contrast set > 1. A finding 1356 
that is consistent with the use of a negation tag for non-binary opposites.  1357 
There are several points to make. First, in these visual world tasks, participants did not 1358 
have to draw inferences, nothing depended on what the contrast set members might predict. 1359 
Second, unlike our more real world materials, the contrast sets had no probabilistic structure. So, 1360 
if the coloured dot was not blue it was equally likely to be one of the other three dots in the 1361 
display. In our materials, for example, if Johnny did not travel to Manchester, he was far more 1362 
likely to travel to Dublin than to Paris.  Third, our experiments showed that people do not seem 1363 
to have any trouble representing structured contrast sets with more than one member and 1364 
drawing appropriate inferences over whatever mental representations of this situation they 1365 
construct. Fourth, it also seems theoretically incongruous to argue that people automatically 1366 
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recode contrasts sets > 1 with negation tags but also argue that the use of a member of a contrast 1367 
set > 1 to deny (affirm) a (negated) proposition causes a recoding problem. If people 1368 
automatically recode these sets with negations tags, then why do they not automatically recode 1369 
members of one of these sets when encountered in inference? If these contrast sets are 1370 
automatically recoded with a negation tag, then the first hurdle in the mental model 1371 
implementation of double hurdle theory has been jumped. Moreover, the second hurdle, double 1372 
negation inferences for MT and DA, is probably a red herring. Our mini meta-analysis showed 1373 
strong implicit negations effects also for MP and AC (see the introduction to Experiment 1), 1374 
which our experiments replicated. 1375 
Although it is unclear how it could integrate with the MMT account of the implicit 1376 
negation effect, MMTs have been extended to capture probabilistic effects by annotating the 1377 
possibilities they represent with probabilities (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, & 1378 
Caverni, 1999). To model the current data this would involve representing the nine possible 1379 
states in the JPDs in Tables 2 and 6 and their associated probabilities. The resulting mental model 1380 
would be a notational variant of these tables. People would then have to calculate the relevant 1381 
conditional probabilities by summing over the annotations to the relevant models (cells) and 1382 
using the ratio formula (see Footnote 11).  Prima facie, it seems unlikely that people are 1383 
performing these calculations during inference, rather than compiling a representation as in 1384 
Figure 7 during learning. Of course, because either theory would predict the same subjective 1385 
calculated conditional probabilities they would predict the odds of people endorsing an inference 1386 
equally well. The problem for MMT is that this is not its theory of the implicit negation effect. 1387 
Moreover, it proposes an implausibly direct implementation of the joint probability distributions 1388 
in Tables 2 and 6 and of the operations defined over them. 1389 
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We do not need to deny that our mental representations use negation tags on occasion. As 1390 
we have pointed out, identifying contrast sets does not exhaust the way people used negations in 1391 
natural language (Horn, 1989), and some may require people to represent information with a 1392 
negation tag. We would argue, however, that our normally shallow knowledge of the world (Keil 1393 
& Rozenblit, 2004; Sloman & Fernbach, 2017), like someone’s knowledge of Johnny’s 1394 
travelling habits, means that most contrast sets are not large and are not much like the abstract 1395 
domains of letters, numbers or coloured dots. 1396 
 1397 
Modelling the Default Prior Pr0.  1398 
Our focus has been on showing that targeted experimental manipulations of probabilities can 1399 
produce or remove the implicit negation effect. However, can our account model the original 1400 
implicit negations effect? The data have been reported in two different ways. Evans and Handley 1401 
(1999) contrast whole tasks using explicit negations only (the explicit negations paradigm) with 1402 
whole tasks using implicit negations only (the implicit negations paradigm). Eight of the possible 1403 
sixteen conditions can reveal implicit negations effects. For example, MP on if ¬p1 then q1 can 1404 
use an explicit, ¬p1, or an implicit, p2, categorical premise.  The implicit paradigm alone also has 1405 
eight conditions that reveal implicit negations effects (Schroyen et al. 2000). For example, MP 1406 
on if p1 then q1 must use p1 to assert the affirmative antecedent, whereas MP on if ¬p1 then q1 can 1407 
use a contrast set member p2 to assert the negative antecedent. Both cases produce an implicit 1408 
negations effect. For the same inference (e.g., MP) endorsements of the conclusion (q1) fall 1409 
compared to using the explicit negation (¬p1) on the same rule (if ¬p1 then q1) or the affirmative 1410 
(p1) on a different rule (if p1 then q1) where the target clause is affirmative. Here we modelled the 1411 
data from the implicit negations paradigm. 1412 
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 We modelled the six implicit negations paradigm conditions in Evans and Handley (1999: 1413 
Experiments 1: conditions: no-pictures, pictures, & Experiment 3) and Schroyens et al. (2000: 1414 
Experiment 1: conditions: set sizes 3, 5, and 9). There were 131 participants and 96 data points. 1415 
There is one complication. We had to model each of the four rules as if they involved different 1416 
content. First, this is always the case experimentally because the intention was to see what 1417 
follows from each rule independently. Second, if the same content is used, as it has been in 1418 
examples apparently questioning the probabilistic interpretation (Schoyens & Schaeken, 2003), 1419 
various conceptual absurdities result (Oaksford & Chater, 2003b). Third, the probability 1420 
conditional does not allow certain pairs of conditionals to be true (or to have high probability) at 1421 
the same time. The probability conditional respects the law of conditional excluded middle. In 1422 
standard binary logic if p then q and if p then ¬q are consistent. They can both be true if the 1423 
antecedent is false. In contrast, for the probability conditional, for which Pr(if p then q) = Pr(q|p), 1424 
these conditionals cannot be true together because if Pr(q|p) = 1, then Pr(¬q|p) = 0.16 So, if these 1425 
conditionals shared the same content then they cannot both have a high probability. The same 1426 
argument applies to the pair if ¬p then q and if ¬p then ¬q. Finally, the four conditionals in the 1427 
negations paradigm are also related by necessity and sufficiency. So, if they share content, then if 1428 
p then q suggests that p is sufficient for q and if ¬p then ¬q suggests that p is necessary for q. If 1429 
p is necessary and sufficient for q then this should affect endorsements of DA and AC, which 1430 
would now be valid inferences. In summary, using the same content creates unwanted 1431 
dependencies between the four conditionals that we can rule out only by using different content 1432 
as is typically done in these experiments. 1433 
                                                 
 
16 However, many advocates of the probability conditional hold that they do not have truth conditions, and, 
consequently, it would be more accurate to say that these two conditionals cannot both be acceptable. 
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Figure 8 1434 
Modelling the Implicit Negation Effect 1435 
  1436 
 We fitted the model using the minimal contrast set structure of two members (overall set 1437 
size = three) for both antecedent and consequent as in Tables 2 and 6. We modelled each 1438 
conditional separately thereby assuming different content. The parameters were the nine joint 1439 
probabilities (a – i), which, because they must sum to one, meant there were eight free 1440 
parameters, to model 24 data points. Because the data constitute six replications of 16 data 1441 
points, the best a model can do is predict the mean across replications. With this number of free 1442 
parameters, this was indeed the outcome of the model fitting (see, Figure 8), the model 1443 
accounted for 78% of the variance in the data (coefficient to determination R2 = .78). 1444 
Figure 8 also separates out the data points for which a contrast set member (implicit) 1445 
affirms a negative or denies an affirmative (unfilled dots) and those where the negated 1446 
constituent (explicit) affirms a negative or denies an affirmative (filled dots). Figure 8 shows that 1447 
the implicit data and the predicted conditional probability were always lower than the explicit 1448 
cases. So, the explicit cases (if p then q, if p then ¬q) for MP, always had higher probabilities of 1449 
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the conclusion/proportion of endorsements than the implicit cases (if ¬p then q, if ¬p then ¬q). 1450 
We show the best fitting parameter values in the Appendix, Table A1. They will allow us to 1451 
calculate various quantities to see whether these results conform to recent proposals about 1452 
conditional inference called “inferentialism.”  1453 
In summary, our account of the implicit negation effect can account for the original 1454 
effects observed using all four rules in the negations paradigm. The fundamental insight is that 1455 
the use of a contrast set member raises the possibility that it does not predict the conclusion as 1456 
strongly as the explicitly negated categorical premise of a conditional inference. In this sense, the 1457 
cardinality of the contrast set account is correct in that any contrast set > 1 will raise this 1458 
possibility (Schroyens, et al., 2000). However, the internal probabilistic structure of the ad hoc 1459 
categories suggested by the assertion of the conditional causes the effect, not a difficulty in 1460 
recognizing the contrast set member as an instance of the negated category.  1461 
  1462 
Probabilities 1463 
The calculated conditional probabilities predicted the odds of endorsing an inference well. 1464 
However, even for those participants who understood the probability manipulation (high 1465 
correlation) very low probabilities still frequently led people to endorse an inference. We could 1466 
not expect people’s subjective probabilities to track the objective probability manipulation 1467 
exactly. On the Bayesian view of probabilities, they are always relative to what somebody knows 1468 
or believes, so the general form of a subjective probability statement is Pr(p|B), where B stands 1469 
for an individual’s background beliefs. People know more about the domains of animals and 1470 
vehicles and their colours than is given in the probability-learning task. Although the subjective 1471 
estimates did follow the objective probabilities quite well.  1472 
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One reason why endorsement rates may be high even for low calculated conditional 1473 
probabilities, is that across all conditions the mean conditional probability was high at around 0.7 1474 
(Expt. 1: Objective = .72, Subjective = .68(.19); Expt. 2: Objective = .71, Subjective = .75(.32); 1475 
Expt. 3: Objective = .71, Subjective = .75(.32)). Consequently, on average, participants should 1476 
endorse an inference, although this will depend on their personal criterion or cut-off. Moreover, 1477 
they should endorse five out the six inferences they experienced in each manipulation, which 1478 
again may bias participants towards endorsement. Given this potential bias toward endorsement, 1479 
it is impressive that our results nonetheless showed a strong effect of calculated conditional 1480 
probability on the odds of endorsing an inference.  1481 
 Another reason why the calculated conditional probabilities may not be better predictors 1482 
of inference endorsement is the indirect method of computation and the reliance on the ratio 1483 
formula to compute the conditional probabilities (Pr(q|p) = Pr(p, q)/Pr(p)). The probability 1484 
verification task is similar to versions of the probabilistic truth table task (Over et al, 2007). This 1485 
task has been criticized as perhaps not revealing people’s probabilistic interpretations of the 1486 
conditional (Jubin & Barrouillet, 2019). The precise reasons do not matter, but an immediate 1487 
response is that (a) these tasks (especially our task which involves filling in 9 cells of the JPD) 1488 
creates a lot of room for error, and (b) the subjective Bayesian approach rejects the frequentist 1489 
method and the ratio formula for calculating conditional probabilities. On the Bayesian 1490 
interpretation, conditional probabilities are basic and suppositional, that is, they based on the 1491 
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Figure 9 1499 
Predicting Endorsement Rates from Confidence for High and Low Correlation Groups 1500 
 1501 
Notes: A: Experiment 2, B: Experiment 3. For both experiments the model fitted was Endorse ~ 1502 
Conf*Corr + (1|Participant) + (Conf *Corr|PaGr). 1503 
 1504 
People’s probability judgements are more coherent when queried while drawing 1505 
inferences (Evans, Thompson, & Over, 2015). We have already shown that in our experiments, 1506 
calculated conditional probability directly predicts confidence in endorsing an inference. 1507 
Therefore, people’s confidence judgements, which we obtained when people are actually 1508 
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drawing inferences, may provide a more direct measure of the relevant conditional probabilities.  1509 
As we have argued, during inference people effectively perform a Ramsey test, supposing the 1510 
categorical premise to be true (see, Bayes nets). If their degree of belief in the conclusion goes 1511 
above criterion, then they endorse the inference and report this degree of belief as how confident 1512 
they are. If this is the right interpretation, then the suppositional account would predict that using 1513 
confidence as a predictor should lead to a much steeper response curve showing sensitivity at 1514 
both the high and the low ends of the scale. Moreover, if the probability-learning task has 1515 
influenced people’s subjective conditional probabilities as measured by the confidence 1516 
judgements, then we would expect to see a moderating effect of high or low correlation (Corr).   1517 
Figure 9 shows how the odds of endorsing an inference varied with confidence for the 1518 
high and low correlation groups in Experiments 2 and 3. As predicted, the response curves are 1519 
much steeper than for calculated conditional probability, and correlation in the probability 1520 
verification task moderated the effect, especially in Experiment 3. Table 13 shows that in both 1521 
Experiments 2 and 3, using confidence (M1) as a predictor yielded a much better fit to the data 1522 
than calculated conditional probability (M2). However, even in the high correlation group in 1523 
Experiment 3, people still seem biased to endorse an inference as revealed by the left-shift in the 1524 
response curve (see, Figure 9). One would expect the odds of endorsing an inference to be one 1525 
(probability = 0.5) when conditional probability was 0.5. As we observed, this may be because, 1526 
on average, inferences in this task should be endorsed. De-biasing may be possible by balancing 1527 
inferences so that equal numbers should be endorsed or rejected. The moderating effect of 1528 
correlation demonstrates that the effects of the learning-phase endured to affect people’s 1529 
subjective probability judgements, as measured by confidence, in the inference tasks.  1530 
 1531 
 1532 
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Table 13 1533 
Model Comparison for Predicting Inference Endorsement Rates from Confidence vs. Calculated 1534 
Conditional Probability 1535 
 LOOIC SE k ΔLOOIC Δelpd Δse Weight 
Experiment 2       
M1 1852.0 75.2 6.6 0 0 0 .72 
M2 2170.3 75.7 5.8 318.3 -159.2 33.4 .28 
Experiment 3       
M1 788.4 50.9 6.1 0 0 0 .73 
M2 930.2 50.7 5.7 141.8 -70.9 23.2 .27 
 1536 
Notes. M1: Confidence, M2: Calculated Conditional Probability.  Estimated number of 1537 
parameters (k), the difference (ΔLOOIC), the difference in expected log posterior predictive 1538 
density (Δelpd) and its standard error (Δse), and the Bayesian stacking weights (LOOIC-weight).  1539 
 1540 
Inferentialism 1541 
A recent development in the psychology of reasoning is the realization that people tend to 1542 
endorse conditionals only when they believe there is some kind of inferential link between the 1543 
antecedent and the consequent. So for example, they do not regard conditionals like, if the moon 1544 
is made of cheese, Corbyn will be elected Prime Minister as candidates for truth. Although, given 1545 
that the moon is not made of cheese, we would logically have to endorse this conditional as true. 1546 
This is one of the so-called “paradoxes of material implication.” There are two versions of 1547 
inferentialism. On the semantic version, indicative conditionals express inferential or reason 1548 
relations between the antecedent and consequent which are part of the truth conditions of the 1549 
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conditional (Douven, Elqayam, Singmann, & van Wijnbergen-Huitink, 2018; Douven & 1550 
Mirabile, 2018; Mirabile & Douven, in press). On the probabilistic version reason relations are 1551 
probabilistic and part of the acceptability conditions of indicative conditionals (Krzyżanowska, 1552 
Collins, & Hahn, 2017; Skovgaard-Olsen, Collins, Krzyżanowska, Hahn, & Klauer, 2019; 1553 
Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Hahn, & Klauer, 2019; Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Krahl, & Klauer, 1554 
2017; Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2016, 2017). Antecedent and consequent are 1555 
positively probabilistically relevant when Pr(q|p) > Pr(q|¬p), that is, when Delta-P (ΔP, Ward & 1556 
Jenkins, 1965) is positive. ΔP was found to moderate whether the Equation (Pr(if p then q) = 1557 
Pr(q|p)) holds. Only when ΔP > 0, that is, p and q are positively inferentially relevant, does the 1558 
Equation adequately predict whether a conditional is acceptable. 1559 
 The data from the probability verification task and the best fitting parameter values from 1560 
the model fits (see, Modelling the default prior Pr0) allow us to check whether the materials in 1561 
these tasks show positive relevance. For Experiment 2, the objective probabilities for the if ¬p, 1562 
then ¬q rule respected positive relevance. For the MP-manipulation, ΔP (Pr(¬q|¬p) - Pr(¬q|p)) 1563 
= .91 , and for the AC-Manipulation, ΔP = .80. Aggregating across manipulations, for the 1564 
subjective probabilities, mean ΔP = .64 (SD = .36). Only 54 out of 668 calculated ΔPs (7.8%) 1565 
were zero or negative and 52 of these came from the low correlation group. For Experiment 3, 1566 
the objective probabilities for the if p then q rule respected positive relevance. For both the DA- 1567 
and the MT-manipulations, ΔP (Pr(q|p) - Pr(q|¬p)) = .80. Aggregating across manipulations, for 1568 
the subjective probabilities, mean ΔP = .51 (SD = .46). 59 out of the 336 calculated ΔPs (17.6%) 1569 
were zero or negative and all came from the low correlation group. We also checked the best 1570 
fitting parameter values for the four rules in the implicit negations paradigm task and they also 1571 
all showed positive relevance (if p then q: ΔP = .43; if p then ¬q: ΔP = .11; if ¬p then q: ΔP = .19; 1572 
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if ¬p then ¬q: ΔP = .09). It would appear that for abstract conditionals (implicit negations 1573 
paradigm) and those used in these experiments, people assume positive relevance between 1574 
antecedent and consequent.  1575 
 Our results are relevant to an ongoing debate over the truth or acceptability conditions of 1576 
conditionals. On the suppositional view of the conditional, judging whether a conditional is true 1577 
or acceptable should depend on the conditional probability. According to semantic inferentialism 1578 
(Douven, et al., 2018), in addition people must believe that there is an inferential link between 1579 
antecedent and consequent. The existence of this inferential link explains why the antecedent 1580 
explains the consequent for if you turn the key the car starts, but the antecedent of if the moon is 1581 
made of cheese, Corbyn will be elected Prime Minister does not explain the consequent. Another 1582 
example is the contrast between if the sun rises, then the cock crows and if the cock crows then 1583 
the sun rises. Only in the former does the antecedent explain the consequent.17 This hypothesis 1584 
has been tested by asking people how well the antecedent of an abductive or diagnostic 1585 
conditional (e.g, if the cock crows then the sun rises) is explained by its consequent (Mirabile & 1586 
Douven, in press: Experiment 3), thereby providing a measure of explanation quality. 1587 
Participants also judged how strongly they believed the truth of the conclusion of an MP 1588 
inference using the same abductive conditionals. Finally, they completed a probabilistic truth 1589 
table task to obtain a measure of conditional probability. Explanation quality was a better 1590 
predictor of how strongly someone believed that the conclusion of the MP inference was true 1591 
than conditional probability. Explanation quality and conditional probability were also 1592 
correlated, indeed they were more correlated than either was individually with truth. 1593 
                                                 
 
17 Although, the inverse could be regarded as an abductive inferential link (Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, & 
Douven, 2013). 
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 In looking at the relation between confidence and inference endorsement in the last 1594 
section, we interpreted the fact that calculated conditional probability and confidence were 1595 
highly correlated as indicating that confidence provided a more direct measure of conditional 1596 
probability. That was why confidence was a better predictor of inference endorsement. The same 1597 
argument applies to Mirabile and Douven’s (in press; see also, Douven & Mirabile, 2018) 1598 
measure of explanatory goodness, which they also assessed directly for each conditional. 1599 
Consequently, explanatory goodness and confidence may just be better more direct measures of 1600 
conditional probability than the probabilistic truth table task because they more closely follow 1601 
the Ramsey test. So, contradicting Mirabile and Douven (in press), a construct of explanatory 1602 
goodness distinct from conditional probability may not be required to explain the data. 1603 
 However, although this is a plausible line of argument, we would suggest that when you 1604 
believe a conditional you believe it describes some underlying, usually causal, dependency in the 1605 
world (Oaksford & Chater, 2010, 2017, 2020a, 2020b), which is why we suggested modelling 1606 
these data using causal Bayes nets may be a fruitful line of research. That ΔP was positive for the 1607 
main conditionals in our experiments showed that people believed the antecedent was positively 1608 
causally relevant to the consequent because ΔP is the numerator of causal power (Cheng, 1997), 1609 
which provides the weights on the links in a CBN (see Supplementary Online Material). 1610 
Consequently, like semantic inferentialism, we would argue that the reason why confidence and 1611 
explanation quality are better predictors of the odds of endorsing an inference is that people 1612 
directly consider the causal or inferential link, which they do not need to do in the probabilistic 1613 
truth table task. Indeed, if they learn a Bayes net during the learning phase, which requires them 1614 
to consider the inferential link and its direction, then it would be difficult to reconstruct the 1615 
individual cell values of the JPD in the probability verification task. It would require recording 1616 
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the prior over p, instantiating p to each of p1 – 3 and reading off the nine conditional probabilities 1617 
Pr(q = q1 – 3|p =  p1 - 3) and multiplying them by the priors Pr(p = p1 - 3). That people seem capable 1618 
of doing something like this with some degree of accuracy in the probability verification task is 1619 
quite impressive. However, we learn about the world in order to predict and explain it and we 1620 
argue that this requires setting up mental representations that facilitate inference, like the Bayes 1621 
net in Figure 7.  1622 
 1623 
Learning 1624 
Our probability manipulations used brief experiential learning phases, shown in research in 1625 
judgement and decision making to improve performance (Hogarth & Soyer, 2011; Wulf, et al., 1626 
2018). It is worth emphasizing that these learning experiences were short, only 30 trials in 1627 
Experiments 2 and 3, and no attempt was made to get participants to learn the distributions to 1628 
any criterion of accuracy. Nonetheless, these learning experiences profoundly influenced 1629 
participants’ behavior when presented with verbal conditional inference problems. All other 1630 
theories attribute the implicit negations effect to errors in constructing a mental representation of 1631 
the logical form of the premises. In contrast, we have argued that conditionals describe the 1632 
dependencies in the world that allow us to predict and explain it (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2010, 1633 
2020b). It should not be surprising that people are adept at rapidly acquiring the information they 1634 
need from their immediate environment to build small scale models that allow them to do this 1635 
and so to act in that environment.  1636 
The importance of sampling from the environment is also emphasized in decision by 1637 
sampling models (Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Stewart, et al. 2006). Samples may be derived from 1638 
memory, but in novel contexts, where previous experience is little guide, people must sample 1639 
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from the environment. Moreover, the structure of samples or choice options can strongly 1640 
influence decision making (Stewart, Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003). Models like Bayes nets, 1641 
include information about structure (directed links and independence relations) and strength 1642 
(causal strength or the relevant CPT). The probabilities that are used to compute strength can 1643 
come from memory or, in novel contexts, must be sampled from the immediate environment. In 1644 
Bayes nets there also are algorithms for learning not just the relevant probabilities but also the 1645 
network structure of these models (Korb & Nicolson, 2010). That is, learning is integral to these 1646 
models, in a way that it is not in other non-probabilistic theories of verbal reasoning. Moreover, 1647 
as we have seen, how well participants learned the distribution strongly moderated the effect of 1648 
calculated conditional probability and confidence on the odds of endorsing as inference.  1649 
It could be argued that the reliance of our account, and its implementation in Bays nets, 1650 
on learning is a limitation as it only applies when probabilities are learned. However, we have 1651 
shown that the contrast set model also fits the base-line implicit negation effect (see, Modelling 1652 
the Default Prior Pr0). So the same model applies whether the probabilities are provided by 1653 
memory or learned from the immediate environment. Although, of course, the default prior was 1654 
also, presumably, learned, at least in part, from experience. Other probabilistic manipulations 1655 
may be less effective in producing the discriminatory effects we observed in these experiments. 1656 
So, Experiment 1 only showed minimal changes to the default prior when participants were 1657 
given descriptions of the distribution in Table 2 as single event probabilities (e.g., 0.8 or 80%) in 1658 
the pre-learning inference task. Single event probabilities, it would appear, do not update 1659 
people’s default-priors as effectively as experience, as many have argued (e.g., Gigerenzer & 1660 
Hoffrage, 1995). However, it remains to be seen if frequency formats (80 out of a 100) 1661 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), lead to a more effective update as observed in some previous 1662 
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research (Oaksford, et al., 1997, 1999). Sample summaries (Hawkins et al., 2015) are closely 1663 
related to frequency formats. It would be interesting to see whether sample summaries of the 1664 
parameters of the CPT in Table 12 could produce similar effects. These distributions are the most 1665 
relevant to inference but they relate directly only to the forward inferences (MP and DA). An 1666 
interesting prediction of the Bayes net implementation is that when presented with only these 1667 
samples, the backwards inferences (AC and MT) should still track the inverse conditional 1668 
probabilities.  1669 
 1670 
Rationality  1671 
Is people’s behavior on these tasks rational? Answering this question depends on what you think 1672 
people should do when confronted with these inference tasks. Clearly, people are not rational 1673 
with respect to standard conditional logic. Regardless of the whether the negation in the 1674 
categorical premise is explicit or implicit, all that is logically relevant is whether it affirms or 1675 
denies the antecedent or consequent. If it affirms the antecedent (MP) or denies the consequent 1676 
(MT), the inference should be endorsed otherwise it should not be endorsed. Clearly, people are 1677 
not rational with respect to this standard as they happily reject inferences when a clause is denied 1678 
(affirmed) implicitly that they happily accept when it is denied (affirmed) explicitly.  1679 
 People can deduce probabilistic conclusions from uncertain premises (Cruz, Baratgin, 1680 
Oaksford, & Over, 2015; Evans, Thompson, & Over, 2015; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; Politzer & 1681 
Baratgin, 2016; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). In coherence-based probability logics (Coletti 1682 
& Scozzafava, 2002), we can deduce a probability interval from the probabilities of the major 1683 
and minor premise. So, for example, suppose that in Experiments 1 and 2 Pr(¬q|¬p) = 0.8 and 1684 
Pr(¬p) = .8, then the probability of the conclusion of MP must lie in the interval .64 ≥ Pr(¬q) 1685 
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≤ .84. These intervals respect probabilistic coherence assuming only the information given in the 1686 
premises. From this probabilistic logic point of view, again the only significance an implicit 1687 
negation has is being an instance of the relevant negated category. In this paper, we have 1688 
interpreted the evidence given by the categorical premise as either hard (affirmative) or virtual 1689 
(negations) evidence concerning the states of the random variables in a Bayes net, which 1690 
includes full knowledge of the JPD. Probability logic does not typically assume full knowledge 1691 
of the JPD but allows for uncertainty in the categorical premise. Take for example AC, and 1692 
assume that the probability of each categorical premise is the relevant marginal probability in 1693 
Table 2. According to probabilistic coherence, for the explicit negation (AC-Not) the probability 1694 
of the conclusion of this inference on (1) should be in the interval [0, .278] and for implicit 1695 
negation (AC-Con) it should be [0, .937]. However, the mean computed conditional probabilities 1696 
and probabilities of endorsement (in brackets) of each inference was AC-Not: .79 (.97) and AC-1697 
Con: .77 (.94). For AC-Not both probabilities fell well outside of the coherence interval. 1698 
Consequently, people’s behavior in these experiments is not rational with respect to the standards 1699 
of coherence-based probability logic.18  1700 
 From our perspective, reasoning is about rational change of belief (Eva & Hartmann, 1701 
2018; Harman, 1986; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2020a). Here we have modelled inference as 1702 
belief propagation or update in Bayes nets, which respect the laws of probability theory. The 1703 
                                                 
 
 18 It remains possible that probability logic can predict these results by including the information in the 
learning trials as additional premises. However, to explain the implicit negation effects would seem to require an 
account of contrary negation, unavailable logically, but readily implemented using virtual nodes in the Bayes net in 
Figure 7 (Pearl, 1988). 
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extent to which the relevant conditional probabilities predict inference endorsements show the 1704 
extent to which we can view peoples’ reasoning as rational.  In our experimental tasks, the 1705 
learning samples were taken from the same population of experiences as the informant (e.g., the 1706 
vet) asserting the conditional, so the premises should not lead to any changes in the probabilities 1707 
that define people’s enduring beliefs in the CPT of their Bayes net representation.. However, 1708 
there are situations where learning the premises suggests revisions to our degree of belief in a 1709 
conditional premise (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013). Such situations seem to require revising 1710 
our beliefs not just updating them supposing the categorical premise is true. Although beyond the 1711 
scope of our current discussion, guaranteeing the rationality of inference in these dynamic 1712 
contexts remains a more challenging problem (Douven & Romeijn, 2011; Eva & Hartmann, 1713 
2018, Hartmann & Rafiee Rad, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2013). 1714 
 1715 
Common Mechanisms 1716 
In explaining our results, we have not appealed to any mechanisms that are unique to deductive 1717 
reasoning. Rather we have argued that mechanisms like Bayes nets may provide an account of 1718 
the representations and processes underlying the implicit negation effect by providing an 1719 
implementation of how people learn, represent and access contrast sets. We have previously 1720 
argued that CBNs may provide an account of conditional inference, not just with causal 1721 
conditionals (Ali et al., 2011), but with conditionals generally (Oaksford & Chater, 2010a,b). We 1722 
have also argued that they may provide an implementation of inferentialism (Oaksford & Chater, 1723 
2020b). More generally, we have argued that common mechanisms may underlie, inductive, 1724 
deductive and causal reasoning and these are likely to be similar in kind to those that underlie 1725 
judgement and decision-making (Oaksford & Chater, 2020a). Proposals for closer relations 1726 
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between deductive inference and other areas of higher cognition are not new: with judgement 1727 
and decision-making (Manktelow & Over, 1991) and with causal reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1728 
1994).  1729 
 However, there is a contrast with the mental models approach, which also provides 1730 
explanations of inductive, deductive, and causal reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Goodwin, & 1731 
Khemlani, 2018; Johnson-Laird, & Khemlani, 2017). Mental models treats discrete 1732 
representations of possibilities as basic. These possibilities are closely related to the truth table 1733 
cases allowed by the binary logical connectives, but they can be modulated by prior knowledge 1734 
or labelled to capture other forms of inference. Following many other areas of perception and 1735 
cognition, we regard the mind/brain’s task to be the extraction of useful regularities from the flux 1736 
of experience in order to predict and ultimately explain the world. The fundamental mode of 1737 
representation is probabilistic and continuous, and it is only by sampling the brain’s underlying 1738 
stochastic models that we come to represent discrete possibilities. Usually these are just the 1739 
deliverances to consciousness of the results of the processes that actually drive our behavior. If 1740 
we do anything more with them it seems as likely to lead to error as to successful reasoning. So, 1741 
while there is agreement on common mechanism, the new paradigm in reasoning generalizes in 1742 
the opposite direction to mental models, from other areas of cognition to deduction and not from 1743 
accounts of deductive reasoning elsewhere. 1744 
  1745 
Conclusion 1746 
Psychologists are beginning to uncover the rational basis for many of the biases discovered over 1747 
the last 50 years in deductive and causal reasoning, judgement and decision-making. In this 1748 
paper, we have argued that using a manipulation, experiential learning, shown to be effective in 1749 
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judgement and decision-making may elucidate the rational underpinning of the implicit negation 1750 
effect in conditional inference. In three experiments, we created and removed the effect by using 1751 
probabilistically structured contrast sets acquired during a brief learning phase. No other theory 1752 
of the implicit negations effect makes these predictions. We could model our findings well using 1753 
Bayes nets similar to causal approaches to category structure, which also captured further 1754 
intuitions about how contrast sets can identify the most likely opposites. We also showed that our 1755 
results and our Bayes net approach aligns closely to a recent development in the psychology of 1756 
reasoning called inferentialism. A key feature is that we have not appealed to any cognitive 1757 
mechanism or module whose specific task is logical reasoning. This approach is consistent with 1758 
the conclusion of our recent review of new paradigm probabilistic theories, which treats 1759 
argumentation, deduction and induction alike within a probabilistic framework similar in kind to 1760 
processes involved in other areas of cognition (Oaksford & Chater, 2020a).  1761 
 1762 
Context 1763 
We have been explaining biases in human deductive reasoning using Bayesian rational analysis 1764 
for 25 years (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2020a). This pattern of explanation had seemed 1765 
paradoxical because Bayesian reasoning in judgement and decision-making had always seemed 1766 
similarly biased. Recently, however, it has been shown that people’s judgement and decision-1767 
making can be surprisingly rational when probabilities and utilities are learned by experience. 1768 
We used experiential learning phases to allow participants to acquire information about 1769 
probability distributions that should create and remove the implicit negation effect in conditional 1770 
reasoning. This is the first time that discrete experiential learning has been used to manipulate 1771 
probabilities in deductive reasoning tasks. We had already shown that our Bayesian approach 1772 
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could rationally explain polarity biases in conditional inference using the concept of a contrast 1773 
set. Our current experiments show that this account generalises to the implicit negations effect. 1774 
We could also model the effects well using Bayes nets. We show how these data also apply 1775 
directly to recent inferentialist accounts of conditional inference. Our results suggest that similar 1776 
cognitive mechanisms may underlie causal, inductive and deductive reasoning as proposed in our 1777 
recent review of the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2020a). 1778 
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Appendices 2168 
Appendix A1 2169 
Table A1 shows the best fitting parameter values for the implicit negations data from the 2170 
studies cited in the section Modelling the default prior. We used the DEoptim function in R 2171 
(Ardia, Mullen, Peterson, & Ulrich, 2016) to find the globally optimal cell values of the JPD 2172 
providing the best fits to the overall frequency of inference endorsements in these studies. 2173 
 2174 
Table A1 2175 
The best-fit parameter value for the four rules in the implicit negations paradigm task. 2176 
 If p1 then q1 If p1 then ¬q1 
 q1 q2 q3 Total q1 q2 q3 Total 
p1 0.568 0.000 0.015 0.583 0.028 0.224 0.102 0.354 
p2 0.163 0.084  0.011 0.258 0.049 0.136 0.159 0.344 
p3 0.061 0.089 0.007 0.157 0.075 0.011 0.216 0.302 
Total 0.792 0.173 0.033 1.000 0.152 0.371 0.477 1.000 
 If ¬p1 then q1 If ¬p1 then ¬q1 
p1 0.106 0.041 0.146 0.293 0.260 0.052 0.219 0.531 
p2 0.260 0.026 0.096 0.382 0.170 0.094 0.063 0.327 
p3 0.132 0.005 0.189 0.326 0.017 0.080 0.045 0.142 
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Supplementary Online Material 2181 
Causal Bayes nets.  2182 
We have argued that people mentally represent conditionals in a similar way to causal 2183 
Bayes nets (Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011; Ali, Schlottman, Shaw, Chater, & Oaksford, 2010; 2184 
Chater & Oaksford, 2006; Oaksford & Chater, 2010b, 2013, 2016, 2017). Figure S1 shows how 2185 
we can implement the JPD Pr1 in Table 1 in a Causal Bayes net where the weights on the directed 2186 
links correspond to causal powers, Wp (Cheng, 1997). In this network travelling to Manchester is 2187 
treated as the cause of Johnny taking the train, although there may be alternative causes, a, of 2188 
him travelling by train.  2189 
Figure S1 2190 
Causal Bayes Net implementing the JPD Pr1 in Table 1 interpreted causally 2191 
 2192 
In this causal Bayes net, the cause (p) and its alternative (a) are combined using the 2193 
noisy-OR integration rule (Pearl, 1988): 2194 
Pr(q  = 1|p = 1) = 1 – (1 – Wa)(1 – Wp)ind
(p)  (Eq. S1) 2195 
Where ind(p) = 1 when the cause is present (p = 1) and ind(p) = 0 when the cause is absent (p = 2196 
0). 2197 
